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ABSTRACT 
 Insider threats are a costly and dangerous problem for government and 
non-government organizations alike. Considering an insider’s inherently privileged level 
of access on a network, the main principle of network defense—keep potential threats 
and outsiders out—does not apply to insider threats. Current defenses are largely based 
on the detection of insider threat indicators and rely on up-to-date datasets. However, 
insider threat activity is innumerable and as diverse as human behavior itself. We 
hypothesize that characterizing and examining host and organization behavior 
demonstrated on a network presents an opportunity to circumvent this problem. 
Leveraging machine learning to detect behavioral anomalies that indicate the presence of 
an insider threat would enable network administrators to quickly locate and mitigate such 
threats before they cause serious damage. We demonstrate this methodology by 
developing a system that extracts host and organization behavior in three different ways 
from network traffic and uses population-relative metrics to determine host conformity 
with organizational norms. After testing the system on an operational network with over 
8,000 hosts, we show through a series of case studies that our system is effective in 
detecting behavioral anomalies and that our behavior extraction methods are 
complementary. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Insider threats are a costly and dangerous problem for government and non-
government organizations alike. Modern organizations rely on oftentimes vast and 
spanning information networks to share mission critical information and conduct daily 
operations. Information networks are trusted to store sensitive, proprietary, and classified 
information, the unauthorized disclosure of which can lead to immensely expensive or even 
deadly consequences. With insider threats on the rise in the United States, information 
technology (IT) personnel find themselves at the forefront of this struggle. 
Considering an insider’s inherently privileged level of access on an information 
networks, the main principle of network defense—keep potential threats and outsiders 
out—does not apply to insider threats. Typical active defenses against insider threats 
include crude tripwires which rely on up-to-date insider threat indicators. While not 
without merit, these defenses can be easily avoided by a determined insider. Furthermore, 
recent and publicly available information on insider threats is scarce. Notwithstanding, 
insider threat activities are innumerable: they are as diverse a human behavior itself. 
The objective of this thesis is to develop and test a system that extracts network 
host and organizational behavior from network traffic and detects behavioral anomalies 
using unsupervised machine learning techniques for the purpose of insider threat detection. 
The system is developed and tested on Naval Postgraduate School’s (NPS) operational 
network with over 8,000 hosts over a contiguous 6-day period. 
The system extracts host and organizational behavior from network traffic in the 
form of feature vectors using temporal measurements, volumetric measurements, and 
destination examination. We develop and engineer three different types of feature vectors; 
time-of-day vectors for describing human behavior, time interval vectors for describing 
device behavior, and country vectors that characterize human-to-device behavior. The 
system leverages the parallelism offered by the high-performance computer at NPS to 
process days of real-world network traffic to create per-host feature vectors of each type. 
xvi 
The system’s anomaly detection module uses the K-Means unsupervised machine 
learning algorithm to cluster network hosts, and examine hosts’ cluster membership across 
a given contiguous time period. The system specifically accounts for hosts with statically 
assigned IP addresses and wired hosts with DHCP-leased IP addresses. Wireless hosts on 
the network are not accounted for in our analysis because of the shorter lease times and 
transient nature of devices on and off the network. The anomaly detection module also uses 
silhouette scores and a Markov chain to examine host conformity to network trends as 
defined by the population of active network hosts. 
Through a series of case studies, we found that the system is able to effectively 
detect host behavioral anomalies suitable for follow up by a human analyst. Our results 
show that our behavior extraction methodology is effective in characterizing host activity, 
and the resulting feature vector types are complementary in enabling the detection of 
behavioral anomalies. Future work will focus on the establishment of host-specific 
baselines over longer periods of observation. 
xvii 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Insider threats are a costly and dangerous problem for government and non-
government organizations alike. There is a great deal of trust placed in modern information 
networks to store sensitive, proprietary, and classified information—the unauthorized 
disclosure of which can lead to expensive or even deadly consequences. Considering an 
insider’s inherently privileged level of access on a network, the main principle of network 
defense—keep potential threats and outsiders out—does not apply to insider threats. 
Current defenses are largely based on the detection of insider threat indicators and rely on 
up-to-date datasets. However, insider threat activities are innumerable: they are as diverse 
as human behavior itself. Examining and describing foundational host and organization 
behavior demonstrated on a network presents an opportunity to circumvent this problem. 
Leveraging machine learning to detect behavioral anomalies that indicate the presence of 
an insider threat would enable network administrators to quickly locate and mitigate such 
threats before they cause serious damage. We demonstrate this methodology by developing 
a system that extracts host and organization behavior from network traffic. 
A. CONTEXT AND MOTIVATION 
The CERT Division National Insider Threat Center of Carnegie Mellon 
University’s Software Engineer Institute defines an insider threat as someone who “has or 
had authorized access to an organization’s network, system, or data” and  “has intentionally 
exceeded or intentionally used that access in a manner that negatively affected the 
confidentiality, integrity, availability, or physical well-being of the organization’s 
information, information systems, or workforce” [1]. The term insider threat has also been 
used to describe threats such as active shooters—employees who seek to inflict violence in 
their workplace on fellow coworkers. This thesis pertains to insider threats relating to 
computer network and information systems as defined by the CERT Division.  
Businesses and government organizations rely on oftentimes vast and spanning 
computer networks to share mission critical information and conduct daily operations. 
Most organizations simply cannot function without this technology. This makes securing 
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and protecting networked infrastructure a paramount priority. While cyberspace attacks 
launched by an external organization, individual, or silent network intruder are most 
frequently associated with network threats, the Clearswift Insider Threat Index (CITI) 
annual report 2018, claims employees are responsible for 38% of information technology 
(IT) security incidents and 75% result from the actions of their extended enterprise 
(employees, customers, supplier) [2]. Hence insider threats are among the primary threats 
in cyberspace and must be dealt with in order to maintain resilient computer networks. 
According to the “2017 U.S. State of Cybersecurity Survey” conducted by the 
CERT National Insider Threat Center, insider threat incidents primarily result in critical 
system disruption and the loss of confidential or proprietary information [3]. Furthermore, 
29% of the U.S. businesses, law enforcement, and government agencies surveyed alleged 
cybercrimes were most costly when committed by insiders [3]. While it is not exclusively 
the responsibility of IT organizations and personnel to counter insider threats, most United 
States (U.S.) organizations view IT solutions as their primary means to defend against 
insider threats [3]. IT as a whole is uniquely positioned to counter insider threats in 
cyberspace and this survey suggests IT will be provided with the means to do so.  
While other countries have seen a decrease in insider threat activity since 2017, 
insider threat activity has risen in the United States [2]. The U.S. Department of Defense 
(DOD), not immune to this trend, has placed special emphasis on defending against insider 
threats in the wake of high-profile insider threats involving Edward Snowden, Chelsea 
Manning, and Reality Winner [4]. The DOD Insider Threat Program establishes policies 
and standards for insider threat programs within the department that help prevent 
espionage, terrorism, unauthorized disclosure of national security information, and 
degradation of department resources and capabilities as a result of insider threats [5]. This 
program indicates the consequences of insider threats to the DOD are somewhat unique 
compared to elsewhere in the U.S. government (USG) or in the commercial sector. The 
potential for loss of life as a result of the unauthorized disclosure of sensitive or classified 
information makes detecting and preventing insider threats an even more urgent priority 
within the DOD. 
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B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Due to their inherently privileged level of network access, threats from insiders are 
dangerous and costly to USG and commercial organizations. Based to the scarcity of up-
to-date insider threat information and datasets, many detectors rely on crude and 
unrepresentative insider threat indicators. Such detectors can typically be easily evaded by 
a determined insider. 
C. OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE 
This thesis aims to determine how host and organizational behavior be extracted 
from network traffic for the purpose of detecting behavioral anomalies associated with 
insider threats. Additionally, this work will evaluate to what extent machine learning can 
be employed to detect behavioral anomalies for the purpose of insider threat detection. 
The objective of this thesis is to create a system that: 
• Extracts host and organizational behavior from network traffic 
• Detects anomalous behavior demonstrated by a network host using 
machine learning techniques and metrics which evaluate host conformity 
with organizational norms  
• Represents a framework for detecting insider threats using behavioral 
anomalies 
This system does not seek to achieve the performance and timeliness needed from 
a real-world insider threat detection system. Instead, this system will seek to implement a 
methodology for insider threat detection that could be operationalized with proper 
consideration for operational requirements. 
D. THESIS OUTLINE 
Chapter II surveys state-of-the-art efforts to identify and understand how human 
and device behavior is demonstrated on information networks. It also discusses past and 
current efforts to detect insider threats using network traffic and/or machine learning 
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techniques. Chapter III discusses our methodology and initial system design for extracting 
host and organizational behavior from network traffic and using the extracted behavior for 
detecting behavioral anomalies. Chapter IV describes the system implementation, 
including how the system engineers feature vectors which describe host behavior and how 
unsupervised machine learning techniques are used to detect behavioral anomalies. 
Chapter V summarizes our results with an overview and a series of case studies.  
Chapter VI summarizes this work, states our conclusions, and discusses opportunities for 
future work. 
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II. BACKGROUND AND PREVIOUS WORK 
This chapter discusses insider threat detection challenges, anomaly detection for 
the purpose of insider threat detection, research efforts to derive host and organizational 
behavior from network traffic activity, and automated state-of-the-art insider threat 
detection methodologies and technologies that use machine learning. 
A. INSIDER THREATS DETECTION CHALLENGES 
After several decades of research, insider threat detection is still an unsolved 
problem. Given that denying an adversary or wrongdoer access to a network is the primary 
means of defending one’s network, how does one deny access to someone who already has 
access? Despite knowing more than ever before about insider threat behavior in the past, 
insider threats continue to evolve as network technology rapidly advances [6]. This 
phenomenon leaves researchers scrambling trying to find a new set of semi-conclusive 
indicators that could help detect future insider threats. To further complicate the problem, 
acquiring ground truth data on how insider threat behavior currently manifests on networks 
is exceedingly difficult because victimized organizations are often fearful of releasing such 
data for legal or privacy reasons, or fear of tarnishing their public reputation. This is a 
significant obstacle for researchers since many proposed detection techniques require 
ground truth data to measure detection accuracy [7].  
Unlike network intruders whose attacks originate from outside the victim network, 
attacks launched by insiders originate from inside the victim network. This simple 
observation helps explain why detecting insider attacks is more difficult for cybersecurity 
analysts than detecting outsider attacks. As explained by Kelly in [8], “Insider attacks differ 
from outside in that outsiders are more easily detected as intruders when their means of 
access are found to be illegitimate.” This difficulty is the root cause of why insider threat 
analysts often must unfortunately result to forensic analysis post-attack rather than 
detecting and preventing the attack [7].  
Despite the inherent difficulties, the challenge of detecting insider threats and the 
emphasis levied by the government and commercial sector alike continues to attract 
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researchers and spur innovation. At its core, detecting insider threats remains an innately 
human problem; one that must consider the complex phycological, psychosocial, and 
organizational factors explaining why and how an insider becomes an insider threat [9]. 
While this behavioral analysis is a critical part of countering insider threats and must be 
considered alongside technical solutions, we focus on identifying clues that reliably 
indicate insider threat behavior and the technical methodologies that could be used to find 
these clues.  
B. DETECTING ANOMALIES 
Anomaly detection for the purposes of cybersecurity has been thoroughly  
studied for over 30 years dating back to Denning’s statistical model for detecting network 
intrusions in 1987 [10]. Anomaly detection systems used for the purposes of detecting 
malicious network activity rely on having an accurate view of normal network activity in 
order to recognize and flag abnormal network activity [11]. Every anomaly detection 
system assumes that malicious network activity has fundamentally abnormal 
characteristics not shared by normal or benign network activity. Moreover, anomaly 
detection systems assume these inherent (and oftentimes unknown) abnormal 
characteristics or attributes can never be fully hidden or obfuscated despite an adversary’s 
best attempts to do so.  
Non-threatening insiders conform to an “organizational design” where they can be 
expected to behave in accordance with their organization’s rules, social norms, and patterns 
[8]. For this reason, experts agree that anomaly detection is an important factor in detecting 
insider threat activity [12]. Researchers have sought to tailor and operationalize anomaly 
detection systems to discover insider threat activity on computer networks. These detectors 
typically develop an understanding of normal host or organizational network activity and 
use this baseline to flag deviations from the baseline.  
As pointed out by Sommers and Paxton in [11], anomaly detection systems 
typically generate a high number of false positives because they assume every deviation 
from normal is malicious and discount contextual factors that could describe these 
deviations as benign. This is the basis for one of Kelly’s main assertions in [8] that any 
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insider threat detection system must include a human insider threat analyst to “determine 
if anomalous inside network behavior, if not otherwise explained, is a threat.” This 
assertion explains why it is critical to identify conclusive attributes that describe insider 
threat activity which help draw a clear line between benign and malicious activity. In short, 
any detection system should seek to automate the process of finding insider threats to the 
furthest extent possible, thereby reducing the burden on human analysts, but not discount 
the need for them in the overall system. The technical solution proposed in this thesis does 
not attempt to remove humans from the system, instead it attempts to compliment other 
means of countering insider threats. 
Perhaps one of the earliest insider threat detection systems that leveraged anomaly 
detection was in 2009 when Cuputo et al. introduced Elicit. Elicit generated user-specific 
datasets by collecting information from a user’s network traffic, digital object usage, and 
ancillary contextual information [13]. Their detector uses Bayesian networks to generate a 
threat score for a user’s daily activity based on the probability of the activity being 
malicious—or indicative of an insider threat. Elicit collected and processed network traffic 
to create per-user “information-use events” corresponding to activities in which a user read, 
wrote, or printed documents stored on an organization’s intranet [13]. Furthermore, Elicit 
gathered user events corresponding browsing and searching. Elicit used additional 
contextual information including users’ job titles, departments, and office locations to 
derive more meaning from information-user events, allowing Elicit to identify suspicious 
events when a user deleted or copied a document maintained by a different department, for 
example [13]. Caputo et al.’s Bayesian network “encodes the probabilities of occurrence 
for each activity for benign and malicious users” based on organizational norms, which 
were determined with the help of insider threat subject matter experts (SME) [13]. 
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) project Anomaly 
Detection at Multiple Scales (ADAMS) further leveraged anomalies in large datasets in 
order to detect insider threats in USG networks [14]. DARPA used machine learning 
techniques to identify user anomalous activity. One of ADAMS’s most significant 
contributions was identifying anomalies most typically generated by insider threats. 
ADAMS confirmed through empirical data that, as expected, malicious insiders fetch more 
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sensitive information than benign insiders, send more information outside of their 
organization, and are more active than benign insiders [14]. These insider threat activity 
observations paved the way for future generations of detectors by identifying and refining 
a set of confirmed insider threat clues. 
Legg et al. [15] acknowledge the need for robust automation and diverse data 
sources to detect anomalies associated with insider threats. In addition to other records, 
their system harvests email, web, computer access, and physical building access logs for 
network users to construct “daily observation profiles.” Their system assesses the profiles 
to generate alerts based on “threshold-based anomalies” and “deviation-based anomalies.” 
Legg et al. envisioned their system as part of a bigger insider threat detection system where 
human analysts could “reject a detection result, which then refines the parameters within 
the system, to minimize the false positive rate for future observations.”  
C. NETWORK TRAFFIC ACTIVITY 
Using data generated from network traffic to spot anomalies is a common thread 
among many insider threat detection systems. Network users generate copious amounts of 
diverse metadata by executing simple network operations: checking email, web browsing, 
and using chat applications for example. Network traffic refers to the activity on a network, 
typically in terms of packets or flows. Network operators and researchers use network 
traffic measurements to understand network use patterns and trends for the purposes of 
network optimization in terms of performance, robustness, policy enhancements, and 
security. Network traffic analysis is typically conducted by examining packet or flow 
metrics. Depending on the desired insight, meaningful network traffic metrics include 
source, destination, length, and duration. The usefulness of these metrics is why network 
flows are sometimes used in network traffic analysis. Flows generalize and organize 
network traffic based on the source and destination of transmitted packets. Flows are 
typically aggregated by sampling packets in order to reduce overhead associated with 
collecting and examining every packet. The objective of one’s analysis dictates their use 
of individual packets or flows. Using flows is often desirable because of the reduced 
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overhead and because modern sampling techniques yield flows that accurately represent 
network activity [16]. 
Researchers and insider threat analysts recognize network traffic as a valuable 
source of information to describe a user’s daily activity and possibly identify insider threat 
activity [6]. When one uses network traffic as a source of data in detecting insider threats, 
there is an implicit assumption that the network traffic one generates reflects the threat’s 
behavior. Benign traffic is generated by insiders who conform to organizational norms, 
whereas malicious traffic is generated by insiders who demonstrate insider threat behavior. 
Given this assumption, we can expect insider threats to express behavioral anomalies via 
the network traffic they generate.    
1. Human Behavior Revealed in Network Traffic 
If we agree a population’s uncoerced behavior expressed on personal social 
network accounts accurately reflects true thoughts, motivations, and ideas, we can 
transitively extend this to assume a population’s digital footprint at the metadata-level also 
accurately expresses its behavior. Researchers hypothesize that web activity (revealed from 
raw network traffic) reveals organizational dynamics [17], [18]. Gonçalves and Ramasco 
conducted an experiment to determine if “laws govern the frequency with which a person 
visits a given website, or is each individual intrinsically unique” [17]. They analyzed the 
logs of an Emory University web server that covered a 292-day period. Their analysis 
showed that a population’s common behaviors can be inferred from individual server 
requests [17]. As intuition suggests, they found the circadian rhythm of a population can 
be inferred along with the impact of holidays on a population. Their results also showed 
that individual network users from the same population demonstrate similar request 
patterns to a server for the same website. Furthermore, this result indicates that the usage 
patterns of a work-oriented website are similar. This observation is useful in our pursuit of 
insider threats, because it likely indicates that misuse is distinct (anomalous) from the 
typical usage demonstrated by the population. 
In [18], Radicchi was also able to infer a notion of normal human behavior on the 
web from which we could detect anomalies. Radicchi used a diverse dataset of America 
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Online (AOL) search queries, eBay feedback messages, and Wikipedia logging actions. 
This dataset captures user interevent times between the user actions on each of the three 
websites. Radicchi attempts to find universal rules that govern the spontaneous actions of 
users on the web by examining interevent times. He concludes that “the shape of the single 
user’s interevent time distributions is strongly influenced by the total numbers of 
operations performed by the users” [18]. However, he also finds a universal rule for human 
activity on the web by applying relative weights to interevent times. In summary, Radicchi 
was able infer patterns that define user activity and global activity. Whereas in [17] the 
authors are able to draw conclusions about humans who have a common membership in an 
organization (revealing organizational dynamics and patterns), Radichhi’s dataset applies 
to a larger subset of the global population, allowing him to make global inferences about 
human activity on the web. For the purposes of insider threat detection, Radichhi’s work 
suggests humans can be profiled based on web activity interevent time distributions and 
behavioral anomalies detected thereafter. Furthermore, behavioral anomalies could be 
recognized on a global scale—an invaluable characteristic for making an insider threat 
detector portable and relevant to a diverse set of networks.  
2. Detecting Behavior Anomalies in Network Traffic 
Network traffic is a natural source of data for recognizing the human behavior on 
the web as mentioned in [17] and [18]. Carefully considered measurements taken from 
appropriate network vantage points offer a plethora of diverse information about a 
network’s operations and users [19]. If interpreted correctly, network traffic packet 
captures allow us to track most of an insider’s activities, perhaps most notably their client-
server connections. However, this diversity also offers unique challenges to anomaly 
detection systems. As explained by Sommers and Paxton in [11], “Even within a single 
network, the network’s most basic characteristics … can exhibit immense variability, 
rendering [anomaly detection systems] unpredictable over short time intervals” [11]. 
Anomaly detection systems have difficulty classifying bursts of activity which happen 
regularly in typical networks [11]. Due to variability of network traffic and the resulting 
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high likelihood of reported false positives, it is critical that we lower the cost of false 
positives and carefully evaluate what anomalies the system detects and why [11]. 
In 2000, Mahoney and Chan introduced a network traffic anomaly detector that 
used packet header values and ranges to detect abnormalities [20]. Their work proved that 
some network attacks could be detected at higher accuracy than previously seen without 
using the application payload, destination address, or port numbers (which were previously 
believed to be necessary for a successful detector). They also found their best results were 
obtained when their model examined “each field and each packet separately” [20]. While 
the computational cost of not using network traffic aggregation techniques is potentially 
high, it allows the model to successfully function at a low level without knowledge of the 
protocols being used on the network. This feature allows such a detector to operate 
successfully across different networks with different uses. Considering the wide range of 
network use in the DOD, the portability of such a system could be invaluable for detecting 
insider threat on various DOD networks. 
Unlike Mahoney and Chan, Lakhina et al. in 2005 argued using network flow 
captures allows an anomaly detector to search for a larger and more diverse set of 
anomalies across a network [21]. While they acknowledge the challenge of handling these 
big data sources, they argue using network flows allow “general network anomaly 
diagnosis” instead of diagnosing localized anomalies in subsections of the network. The 
generality they aspired to achieve in their anomaly detection system is an important 
characteristic in today’s world where old network attacks are constantly evolving, and new 
network attacks are constantly arising. They aspired to create a general anomaly detection 
system that “was not restricted to any predefined set of anomalies” [21]. In the spirit of 
achieving generality in their system, Lakhina et al. classify anomalies simply as events that 
disturb network flow feature distributions, and use entropy to identify anomalous changes 
in the distributions [21]. While they implement their systems differently, Lakhina et al. and 
Mahoney and Chan furthered the idea that network traffic anomaly detectors can be 
effective and highly versatile. 
A recurring theme in most of the proposed insider threat detection systems or 
anomaly detection systems, is that any such system should be a system of systems with 
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layers of diverse security measures. There is not a single tool or mechanism that will detect 
insider threats or network traffic anomalies with near-perfect accuracy by itself. This is an 
accepted idea by the research community and insider threat experts alike [1], [11], [20]. 
With this layered approach in mind, most modern insider threat detection systems leverage 
multiple sources of data and include network traffic to develop a more complete picture of 
user activity and behavior. Commonly used data sources are shown in Figure 1. Splunk 
User Behavior Analytics (UAB) and IBM QRadar UAB are examples of such modern 
insider threat detection systems [22], [23]. As advocated in [21], IBM advertises that its 
QRadar UAB system uses network flows and logs to develop per user activity baselines 
from which it can identify user anomalous activity and generate user risk scores [23]. 
By developing what they call Beneficial Intelligent Software (Ben-ware), 
McGough et al. provide insight into how Splunk and IBM identify anomalous human 
behavior via network traffic [24]. Ben-ware is a low-weight, distributed hierarchical system 
designed for typical organizations with heterogeneous networks. Ben-ware uses low-level 
host-based probes that collect “events” that define user behavior on the network. The 
events include system log-ins, user interaction with external storage devices, file use, and 
HTTP requests. The HTTP request information includes number of HTTP requests, out of 
hours HTTP requests, and HTTP requests on black-listed sites. Perhaps the most unique 
aspect of Ben-ware is its use of “human factors and analysis to influence and develop AI 
techniques,” allowing Ben-ware to limit the number of false positives that plague many 
insider threat detectors [24]. This unique feature of Ben-ware identifies users who are more 
likely to be a “criminal threat” rather than those who exhibit negligent but non-malicious 
intent [24]. Collaboration with criminologists and behavior analysts enabled McGough et 
al. to integrate this additional feature set into Ben-ware, and they claim that the information 
they used is common and already possessed by many organizations through routine human 
resource processes. McGough et al.’s implementation of Ben-ware to detect insider threats 
confirms that network traffic is a key data source in detecting behavioral anomalies. 
However, by integrating other human factors into their system, they acknowledge that 
network traffic is an insufficient data source by itself.  
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Figure 1. Data sources for insider threat detection. Source: [1]. 
D. MACHINE LEARNING 
Many insider threat detection systems apply statistical analysis and machine 
learning algorithms to big data in order to identify anomalous behavior exhibited by insider 
threats. Given there are not unique signatures or absolute rules associated with insider 
threat activity, detectors using machine learning are an attractive solution. Instead of 
attempting to explicitly program a detector to recognize predetermined insider threat 
indicators, a detector using machine learning seeks to recognize insider threat and benign 
activity by learning from examples. In essence, such a detector generates its own rules and 
indicators from the presented data. This automation offered by machine learning enables 
security personnel to glean valuable insight from big unprocessed data that a human would 
otherwise be unable to interpret. If we envision an insider threat detection system as a 
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collection of subsystems, machine learning allows security personnel to maintain a 
supervisory role over an organization’s insider threat program; keeping them out of the 
minutia of any single subsystem and enabling them to make top-level inferences from 
intelligence (instead of raw data or information) derived from multiple subsystems. While 
not without its own set of challenges, machine learning is a valuable facet of insider threat 
detection and its implementation in existing detectors and prototypes proves this. 
1. Machine Learning Challenges 
Machine learning algorithms are commonly classified as supervised, unsupervised, 
or semi-supervised. Supervised learning, relying on ground truth or labeled data to train a 
model, is oftentimes infeasible for insider threat detection for several reasons. First, there 
are few publicly available datasets labeling insider threat activity [6], [11]. Supervised 
machine learning algorithms seeking to classify an object or activity—particularly artificial 
neutral networks—thrive and produce their best results when they observe and learn from 
numerous examples of the object or activity they are trying to classify. Victim 
organizations of insider threat in the commercial sector and government are reluctant to 
release insider threat data because of its sensitive nature, frequently containing personal 
information or private details of an organizations activity [11], [25]. Second, insider threat 
data—for example, insider threat network traffic—is minuscule when compared to benign 
network traffic. As a result, the rare datasets that do contain insider threat activity are highly 
imbalanced, which are not conducive for supervised machine learning algorithms such a 
decision trees [26], [27]. Third, it is difficult for supervised machine learning models to 
accurately classify insider threat activity due to its diversity. The most common insider 
threat activities (excluding espionage or unintentional damage) are IT sabotage, theft of 
intellectual property, and fraud [1]. Although they are all examples of insider threat 
activity, these activities are very diverse, and the set of all possible actions taken by an 
insider threat to execute these activities is also large and diverse. This diversity and 
uncertainty constitute a significant problem for supervised machine learning models, 
especially for those that rely on commonalities between cases of the same class to classify 
new cases.  
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Due to the difficulties in using supervised machine learning to implement insider 
threat detectors, researchers and innovators often resort to semi-supervised or unsupervised 
machine learning. Unsupervised machine learning algorithms are typically used in an 
exploratory fashion, grouping similar objects together thereby isolating anomalous 
outliers. While it might seem intuitive that unsupervised learning can be applied to insider 
threat detection, which tries to discover behavioral anomalies that are by definition 
dissimilar from normal behavior, unsupervised learning in practice is difficult to 
operationalize [11]. Although Sommers and Paxton explain why, “despite extensive 
academic research one finds a striking gap in terms of actual deployments of such systems 
[anomaly detectors]” in terms of intrusion detection systems, we believe the same 
explanation applies to insider threat detectors leveraging anomaly detection.  
2. Machine Learning Algorithms 
In this section, we examine (and in some cases, reexamine) several insider threat 
detection systems for the purpose of evaluating the specific machine learning algorithms 
they used. We find that many times the machine learning algorithms attempted are 
predicated by the data on which the authors chose to train and/or evaluate their machine 
learning model. This is an unfortunate reality due to (as already discussed) the lack of real-
world insider threat datasets. For this reason, a short discussion on the common types of 
insider threat datasets and their merits and inferiorities is warranted. 
Insider threat datasets used to train and/or evaluate detectors using machine 
learning can broadly be classified as synthetic or real. CERT proposed a popular publicly 
available synthetic insider threat dataset that was generated to mimic a realistic 
organization with insider threat instances [15], [25], [26]. Others such as McGough et al. 
choose to generate their own synthetic data based upon insider threat scenarios on which 
they test and train their detectors [24]. Being able to recognize and correctly classify benign 
data is important for reducing the number of false positives a detector produces. For this 
reason, insider threat detectors are also oftentimes exposed to real, anonymized data from 
operational networks sourced from a university, for example, that is supportive of academic 
research in the area of insider threats [28]. Despite the popularity of synthetic data, 
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researchers widely agree there is no substitute for real data collected from an operational 
network when training and/or evaluating detectors because of the inherent difficulties in 
adequately representing the diversity of human behavior in synthetic data [11], [25]. 
Simulating insider threat data, while still not as good a real-world data, signifies a worthy 
step in the right direction. Harilal et al. simulated insider threat data by designing a 
“gamified competition” in which participants organized into teams and competed against 
each other in a corporate scenario [29]. Participants in the game were incentivized through 
scenarios in the game to act as masqueraders and traitors, thereby creating realistic insider 
threat activity traces [29]. 
a. Semi-supervised Machine Learning Approach 
While more difficult to implement in insider threat detection systems due to the 
dataset limitations we have already discussed, researchers have experimented with using 
semi-supervised machine learning to detect insider threats when labels are available for at 
least a small subset of their data. Within their ADAMS project, DARPA simulated insider 
threat activity through an experiment they called the Behavioral Analysis of Insider Threat 
(BAIT) framework. Participants in the experiment were permitted to fetch, edit, write, 
print, and/or send documents or data for the purpose of exfiltrating the data without being 
detected. These participant actions were used by the research team as dataset features for 
their machine learning model to detect insider threat activity. The experiment resulted in a 
highly unbalanced and mostly unlabeled dataset [14], [30]. DARPA demonstrated the use 
of bootstrapped semi-supervised machine learning algorithms based on traditional learning 
algorithms including Support Vector Machines (SVM) and multinomial Naïve Bayes to 
differentiate the behavior or malicious users and benign users [14], [30]. 
Mayhew et al., who developed Behavior-Based Access Control (BBAC) seeking to 
defend DOD networks from insider threats, also use a combination of supervised and 
unsupervised machine learning algorithms to detect insider threat behavior [31]. BBAC 
ingests network traffic to include network flow information, data generated from higher-
level transport protocols, and audit records from DNS servers [31]. BBAC also ingests and 
processes application-level content such as email and chat messages. From the network 
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traffic and application-level content it ingests, BBAC extracts features derived from user 
TCP connections, HTTP requests and responses, email and chat messages, and 
collaborative web page edits (specifically MediaWiki). BBAC uses the K-means 
clustering, SVM, and decision tree algorithms in a unique way to “improve scalability and 
reduce false positives” [31]. BBAC uses the K-Means algorithm to cluster network users 
and network devices based on their observed behavior in order to establish a baseline of 
normal activity for each category. The authors claim that “in addition to increasing 
accuracy through grouping entities with similar behavior into clusters,” this methodology 
also improves system performance in terms of speed by allowing them to logically partition 
data and distribute it to separate cluster nodes for training and classification [31]. BBAC 
uses SVM classifiers to apply supervised machine to each cluster in order predict whether 
specific network users and network devices are behaving anonymously. To support 
integration with human analysts, BBAC also uses decision trees. Mayhew et al. derive a 
set of rules that define each K-means cluster and use these rules to build a decision tree for 
each cluster of network users and network devices. Being significantly more intuitive and 
easier to understand than other classifiers, the decision trees allow human analysts to 
understand why a user or device was assigned to a specific cluster over another. The 
decision trees also allow human analysts to assign users or devices with little or no 
collected data to a cluster by the K-means algorithm if needed [31].  
b. Unsupervised Machine Learning Approach 
Caputo et al. used real network data collected from an operational corporate 
network to test Elicit [13]. Initially they employed anomaly detection to identify 
“suspicious behaviors that violate organizational norms” including network volumetric 
anomalies [13]. Despite their data not being labeled, they were able to use hypotheses about 
insider threat behavior formed by consulting with insider threat SMEs to obtain 
probabilities and dependencies of anomalies being associated with insider threat activity. 
These probabilities and dependencies were used to create Bayesian network which 
evaluated an overall threat score for each user [9]. Although, Bayesian methods are 
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typically associated with supervised learning, Elicit initially relies on unsupervised 
learning techniques to identify anomalies. 
For Ben-ware, McGough et al. used Support Vector Data Description (SVDD) and 
clustering techniques to identify outliers as insider threats [24]. SVDD, a classifier 
developed from the popular Support Vector Classifier, was used to calculate “minimum 
bounding hyper-spheres” around clusters of network users from which they could identify 
outliers [32]. One of their key observations was the increase in detection performance when 
they used a clustering technique such as K-means clustering and then applied SVDD to the 
resulting cluster. McGough et al. hypothesize that this method allows them to capture user 
sub-profiles that are a result of a user changing roles within their organizations or 
performing multiple roles [24]. 
3. Online and Offline Machine Learning 
Online machine learning learns from data streams whereas offline machine learning 
learns from batches of data. Training on continuous data streams allows a model to be to 
be incrementally updated as it ingests new data. In this way, the model adjusts its 
parameters in accordance with new network usage patterns, thereby enabling it to make 
more informed predictions as well as increasing its overall performance. Aside from the 
obvious performance advantages, online machine learning techniques offer several other 
practical advantages over batch machine learning techniques for anomaly detectors. As a 
result of not having to train on an isolated batch of data before being operationalized, 
anomaly detectors leveraging online learning techniques can be implemented immediately. 
Such a model establishes a baseline for normal activity over time, gradually increasing  
its ability to provide valuable predictions. Lastly, due to the real-time nature of  
online learning, streaming data is not cached for analysis at a later time. This allows an 
insider threat detector leveraging online learning to make real-time detections, allowing 
human analysts to take action immediately against suspected insider threat activity,  
if warranted [33]. 
Although the seamlessness of online machine learning is difficult in practice to 
implement on an operational network, there have been many research pursuits we can learn 
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from in this regard [11]. Tuor et al. use an online unsupervised machine learning approach 
leveraging a deep and recurrent neural network model to detect insider threats [33]. One of 
the novelties they achieve in their system is presenting an individual user’s activity to the 
model in a single and continuous stream of data. Tuor et al. extract user features from 
system logs. Specifically, they extract user categorical data (role, project, department, etc.) 
and user “counts” that include, for example, “the number of uncommon non-decoy file 
copies from removable media between the hours of 12:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m.” [33]. While 
their use of deep and recurrent neural networks increases the complexity of implementing 
online learning, they are able to overcome this by only allowing the neural networks to 
observe a single sample once and training one recurrent neural network per user [33]. In 
order to allow their system to adapt to new user activity and readjust baselines, they 
continuously update a finite user-specific data structure [33]. 
Similar to Tuor et al., Böse et al. translate streaming data into user-specific streams 
to implement online anomaly detection for the purpose of detecting insider threats [34]. 
These user-specific streams become representative feature vectors that are used by their 
model to detect anomalous behavior. Unlike in [33], each feature vector encompasses a 
user’s current session and a different model is trained for each feature vector. Their feature 
vectors are generated from HTTP logs, logon events, email messages, and removable 
media usage. Each user session feature vector has five attributes: start time, session 
duration, number of emails sent, the presence of removable media (Boolean) and number 
of HTTP requests. Subsequently, they use the K-nearest neighbor algorithm to cluster user 
sessions and produce an anomaly score; if the point meets a specified threshold, it is 
classified as an anomaly [34].  
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter introduced current research efforts and the state-of-the-art 
technologies and methodologies used to detect insider threats. We discussed the use of 
anomaly detection to detect behavioral anomalies expressed by insider threats not 
conforming to organizational conventions. Specifically, this chapter discussed how human 
and organizational behavior is expressed via network traffic, and how the proper 
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application of network traffic analysis can characterize human behavior. We also discussed 
the use of machine learning as part of a greater insider threat detection system to automate 
the fine-grained analysis of big data. The following chapter describes the integration of 
network traffic analysis and machine learning to detect behavioral anomalies indicative of 
insider threats. 
21 
III. METHODOLOGY AND SYSTEM DESIGN 
This chapter introduces and discusses our methodology and system design for 
extracting human and device behavior from network traffic and identifying behavioral 
anomalies for the purpose of detecting insider threats caused by both users and 
misconfigured devices. 
A. INTRODUCTION  
As discussed in Chapter II, network traffic is a popular source of information 
commonly leveraged by insider threat detection systems to track and analyze hosts’ 
network activities [22], [23], [31]. In addition to explicitly revealing one’s network activity, 
network traffic can also reveal human and organizational behavior to include usage patterns 
and preferred network services [17], [18]. However, extracting behavior from network 
traffic is an inexact and difficult task. Those who endeavor to do so must contend with the 
high volume and diversity characteristic of network traffic [11]. Furthermore, acquiring 
suitable network traces is oftentimes challenging in itself for several reasons. First, for 
reasons already discussed in Chapter II, organizations are oftentimes reluctant to share 
network traffic [11]. Second, when collecting network traces, one must employ strategies 
addressing vantage point, accuracy, and calibration (to name a few) which strive for 
soundness. Paxton describes pursuing soundness in Internet measurements as, “developing 
confidence that the results we derive from our measurements are indeed well-justified 
claims” [19]. 
In order to develop an understanding of the human and device behavior embedded 
in network traces, packets must be synthesized in a manner which suits our task. For insider 
threat detection, such a synthesis must help us characterize a network host’s activity. This 
activity allows us to characterize and describe a network host’s normal network activity 
and compare it to the activity of all the hosts on the network. Deviations from the normal 
activity demonstrated by the population of hosts on the network are considered anomalous. 
While this is useful for establishing a baseline for the purposes of detecting behavioral 
anomalies, we also consider more direct insider threat indicators and integrate these into 
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our synthesis. Furthermore, such a synthesis must be compatible with the methodology we 
intend to implement to identify anomalous insider threat behavior. As a result, our system 
will seek to extract behavior in the form of feature vectors, upon which we can apply 
machine learning techniques and statistical analysis, as desired. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
The following paragraphs describe our methodology for implementing an insider 
threat detection system which focuses on detecting behavioral anomalies instead of relying 
solely on potentially unreliable and unknown insider threats signatures. Simply stated, we 
intend to treat insider threat detection as an anomaly detection problem, foremost striving 
to characterize undisguisable human and device behavior demonstrated on a network. Our 
system design broadly consists of two parts, one which extracts behavior from network 
traffic and another that detects behavioral anomalies which are potentially indicative of an 
insider threat. 
1. Extracting Behavior from Network Traffic 
We consider the way in which we extract behavior from network traffic to be the 
most important part of our system. If we are able to accurately and succinctly describe the 
behavior of network hosts (within the context of insider threat detection) from sound 
network traces, then we assess a tailored machine learning pipeline will be able to identify 
behavioral anomalies, indicating a possible insider threat. Partially based on the findings 
in [17] and [18], we use temporal measurements, volumetric measurements, and 
destination examination to describe human and device behavior and engineer 
corresponding features. 
Temporal metrics allow us to observe when a host is active. Volume metrics allow 
us to observe the activity level of a host. For destination examination, inspecting the 
destination ports of only TCP and UDP packets sent by a human or device allows us to see 
preferred ports, and derive the network service a host is using [35]. Understanding the 
network service allows us to reasonably characterize activity type. Destination examination 
is foremost used as a way to engineer features that enable us to see underlying patterns and 
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preferences. However, destination examination also enables us to uncover potentially more 
direct indications of insider threats. Anomalous TCP and/or UDP connections to 
questionable destination countries for the purposes of data exfiltration is an infamous 
feature of past insider threats and is of particular concern to the USG [1]-[4].  
For the purposes of our system, we consider human behavior to be the result of 
network activity initiated at a device which was directly influenced by a human user. That 
is, human behavior is the result of activity demonstrated by a device that would not have 
been initiated without direct human intervention. For example, human activity includes 
HTTPS requests and subsequent DNS queries generated as a result of web browsing. 
Device behavior is demonstrated by device activity that was initiated without, or with 
indirect, human intervention. Examples of device activity include automatic checks for 
software updates and security patches. It is important to note that human and device 
behavior can be—and are oftentimes—exhibited on a single machine. In order to precisely 
capture different behavioral nuances for the purpose of anomaly detection, we extract 
human and device behavior differently. However, we conduct destination examination in 
the same manner for humans and devices.  
The following paragraphs describe our design for different feature vectors that 
characterize human, device, and human-to-device behavior separately. However, these 
descriptions are not intended to be mutually exclusive—we expect human activity to affect 
the features primarily used to describe device behavior and vice versa. But, we do expect 
each feature vector type to describe its given subject better than the other subjects.  
a. Characterizing Human Behavior 
In regard to recognizing human activity patterns, we consider activity over the 
duration of a single day. In order to capture patterns at a finer level, we also consider 
activity within single hours. These time ranges allow us to characterize when a user is 
active holistically over the course of a day; from this information we can infer typical and 
atypical patterns given sufficient time to observe a user. More specifically, we can 
reasonably infer a user’s typical circadian rhythm, when they log onto the network to start 
working, and when they take a break for lunch, to list a few examples. Figure 2 shows our 
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feature vectors before accounting for volume and destination examination. Booleans 
indicate user activity did or did not occur during a given hour.  
 
Figure 2. Temporal measurement for human behavior 
To address volume, we count the number of packets each user sends in each hour 
of a given day. Layering the volume measurement onto our existing feature vectors results 
in feature vectors with numeric values instead of Booleans, as shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. Temporal and volume measurements for human behavior 
Finally, in order to characterize a user’s activity type, we inspect the destination 
port of each packet sent by the user. We count packets sent to the same destination port 
during the same hour. Applying this measurement results in volumetric information broken 
down by destination port, as seen in Figure 4. Instead of accounting for every possible 
destination port, we select and enumerate the most commonly used destination ports across 
the entire network. Hereafter, we will refer to these feature vectors as “time-of-day” 
vectors. 
 
Figure 4. Time-of-day feature vectors describing human behavior 
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b. Characterizing Device Behavior 
We characterize device behavior in a similar way to how we characterize human 
behavior. As previously mentioned, in order to differentiate between human device 
activity, we measure time and volume in a slightly different manner in order to account for 
the high number of requests per time unit characteristic of devices, and the bursty network 
usage associated with humans. This difference also allows us to more accurately profile 
their respective behaviors [17]. The network services used as result of device activity will 
oftentimes in itself allow us to also differentiate it from human activity. For example, 
connections to destination port 8014 for Symantec security updates is likely the result of 
automated device activity. Like humans, devices have preferred destination ports as a result 
of how they were configured.  
Instead of measuring volume over days and hours, as we did for humans in Figure 
4, we measure volume within discrete time ranges for each considered port. That is, we 
count the number of packets transmitted by a device within a given time range, measuring 
the time from when the previous packet was sent to when the next packet is sent. For 
example, if device A exhibits the activity demonstrated in Figure 5, it would result in the 
binned feature vector also portrayed in Figure 5. This histogram of packet interarrival times 
characterizes the rates at which upstream traffic is generated by a particular host. 
 
Figure 5. Temporal and volume measurements for device behavior 
In order to account for how devices typically transmit packets in a regular and high 
frequency fashion, the time range bins have to be small—we assess on the order of 
microseconds. Adding the measurements that were a result of our destination examination, 
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our device feature vectors (hereafter referred to as “time interval” feature vectors) appear 
in their final form, as shown in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6. Time interval feature vectors describing device behavior 
c. Characterizing Human-to-Device Behavior 
For human-to-device behavior we broaden our focus and examine how humans 
interact with distant devices across a network in a single day. While the time-of-day feature 
vectors allow us to specifically target human behavior and purposely disregard external 
factors, our third set of feature vectors should allow us to see how humans interact with 
destination devices. We shift our attention from the temporal metrics that allowed us to 
precisely characterize human and device behavior and further examine destinations and 
volumetric attributes. Instead of inspecting the destination port as we did to characterize 
human and device behavior, we instead examine the destination IP address and lookup its 
location by country. To measure volume, we count the packets sent by a device on the 
network to all destination IP addresses in a single country. Furthermore, we add the lengths 
of the packet payloads sent to a given country to get the total amount of data sent to a 
destination country. 
We assess this balance between utilizing destination and volume metrics to describe 
human-to-device behavior allows us to see the volumetric patterns of how a network host 
interacts with a spatial grouping of destination devices. While it would be interesting and 
beneficial from an insider threat detection perspective to analyze the patterns by which a 
network host interacts with specific destination IP addresses throughout the course of a 
given day, this would be unbeneficial for the machine learning techniques we have chosen 
to employ for anomaly detection and has some other considerable drawbacks as well. For 
example, as we will discuss later, such a methodology would require us to examine how 
the union of network hosts interacts with the union of destination IP addresses. This would 
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require our feature vectors to have thousands of features (columns), and the computational 
costs would not be beneficial for providing an operational solution for insider threat 
detection. Querying destination IP addresses by country also allows us to potentially detect 
indications of data exfiltration by examining the ratio of the number of packets versus the 
amount of data sent to a country. Figure 7 provides an example of how we intend to 
characterize human-to-device behavior with what we call “country” feature vectors. 
 
Figure 7. Country feature vectors describing human-to-device behavior 
While not shown in Figures 4, 6, and 7, we normalize each feature vector separately 
in order to represent each value as a probability. This benefits the machine learning 
techniques we use to detect behavioral anomalies. Of note for the country feature vectors, 
we normalize the union of packet count columns and the union of byte count columns 
(Figure 7) separately due to how these columns represent separate but related activity. 
2. Detecting Behavior Anomalies 
The second part of our system design is focused on detecting behavioral anomalies 
as they occur over time to identify potential insider threat activity. The use of statistical 
methods and measurements has proved effective in insider threat detection [31], [36]. 
However, in many cases, statistics are applied to broad insider threat actions and indicators 
observed in the past, such as file transfers and system calls. While these measurements are 
useful for detecting network use anomalies, they do not offer the granular insight we wish 
to pursue for detecting behavioral anomalies. Furthermore, an insider threat detection 
system which relies on statistical measurements is guaranteed to only detect anomalies in 
the data from which it has chosen to collect, process, and analyze. Stated differently, the 
system’s effectiveness is solely reliant on the data from which the models were trained, 
and if the wrong data is used (e.g., the data is biased in some way), the system may fail. 
This makes the designers of such a system reliant on current and relevant insider threat 
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datasets and indicators, which do not exist. Even if the insider threat research community 
had perfect knowledge of past insider threats and their indicators, the manner in which one 
could seek to overcome or subvert network defense mechanisms to conduct an insider 
attack is too vast and diverse for a system to reasonably enumerate and analyze using 
statistical measurements and methodologies. Insider threat activity is as diverse and 
unbounded as human behavior. We seek to overcome this problem by disregarding 
suspected insider threat indicators and attempting to detect human behavioral anomalies 
using machine learning techniques. 
a. Clustering Network Hosts 
As discussed in Chapter II, machine learning has been widely utilized in insider 
threat detection systems. Given the lack of ground truth regarding malicious activity in our 
data, the lack of known insider threat indicators, and the subtleties and diversity of human 
behavior, unsupervised machine learning will be our primary means of detecting abnormal 
behavior. Unsupervised clustering algorithms allow us to group network hosts according 
to behavioral similarities, and these clusters may form the basis in characterizing how host 
behavior changes over time. In addition, clustering offers valuable insights on a macro-
level regarding external factors and phenomena that affect how a network is being utilized 
holistically. Corroborating the macro and micro-level trends revealed by clustering with 
other information about the network (i.e., static versus Dynamic Host Configuration 
Protocol (DHCP) leased IP addresses, and working hours versus non-working hours), 
offers a sense of ground truth that could help explain the behavioral inconsistencies 
discovered through unsupervised models. However, a significant drawback to using an 
unsupervised model is the lack of feedback regarding how and why a sample (in our case, 
a network host) was clustered or grouped in the manner it was. To address this problem, 
we attempt to use feature selection and supervised learning techniques to describe clusters 
and isolate the most descriptive attributes of a cluster’s occupants. 
Despite issues with accuracy and stability, the K-Means clustering technique is an 
attractive solution due to its simplicity and convergence speed (particularly with large 
datasets with many dimensions) [37], [38]. K-Means utilizes randomly selected centroids 
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to group samples based on variance and iteratively recomputing the centroids as the 
algorithm clusters additional samples and converges. K-Means implementations such as 
Scikit-learn offer the ability to observe each sample’s distance from specified centroids, 
providing a measurement of how similar or dissimilar a sample is with other samples in 
the same cluster [39]. Harking back to our lack of ground truth data, we must determine 
the ideal number of specified clusters to use with K-Means. The well-known silhouette 
score allows us to measure how well our clusters are defined using distances between 
samples sharing the same cluster membership, and distances between samples in the next 
closest cluster [40]. 
b. Cluster Analysis 
Despite their usefulness in other pursuits, K-Means cluster distances and silhouette 
scores do not offer the required context needed for insider threat detection and are alone 
insufficient for determining how network hosts are grouped. While these metrics are 
valuable in determining the number of clusters we should use, they do not reveal why hosts 
with certain behavioral characteristics are grouped. For example, ideally, we want to be 
able to describe the clusters shown in Table 1 according to their most discriminatory 
features and possibly make several tentative assessments. 




of Hosts Discriminatory Features 
Tentative 
Conclusion(s) 
Cluster A 364 (1) low activity level in the 
morning 
(2) high port 443 use in the 
afternoon 
(3) high port 22 use in the afternoon 
(4) sends packets at irregular 
internals 
(1) Workstations used 
by humans 
Cluster B 2001 (1) packets sent at regular intervals 
(2) packets sent at high frequency 
(1) Demonstrate device 
behavior 
(2) Printers 
This table provides an example of how we would like to understand and analyze clusters. For the purpose of 
this example, the “Discriminatory Features” column lists information we would likely have to ascertain from 
several features in the dataset. 
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In order to analyze each cluster, after first clustering hosts with K-Means we use 
dimensionality reduction and feature selection techniques to discover each cluster’s most 
descriptive features. Typically used to reduce the time it takes to train a classification 
model, dimensionality reduction via feature selection is the process of removing the least 
descriptive features from the dataset for a given cluster or label while attempting to 
preserve classification accuracy and recall. Each feature in the dataset is assigned a score, 
and all but the top n scoring features are removed. In our case, we use feature selection to 
isolate and identify each cluster’s prominent features. To simplify this process, we leverage 
a one-versus-all strategy where we judge a given cluster against the union of all other 
cluster samples. Stated otherwise, we cast this as a binomial classification problem 
specifically for the purpose of cluster analysis. 
Through feature selection we are able to learn any given cluster’s most 
discriminatory features, which allows us to draw limited conclusions about the membership 
of the cluster (based on which of the three datasets we are analyzing). However, while these 
features might be the most discriminatory, they may not be effective in discriminating one 
cluster from another. To determine the degree to which these features help differentiate one 
cluster from another, we train and test a decision tree classifier with only the top n features 
outputted by the feature selection process and inspect the classifier’s accuracy, precision, 
and recall. Through this process of feature selection and bootstrapping a supervised 
classifier, we are able to quantify the effectiveness of the clustering. 
c. Identifying Anomalies 
While analyzing how the clusters themselves are formed describes organizational 
behavioral trends (to include anomalies), we are primarily interested in individual host 
behavior relative to individual baselines and macro-level network utilization trends for the 
purpose of insider threat detection. Here, we must take a closer look at cluster membership 
and how members are clustered differently over time. Of note, without a labeled dataset, 
declaring that a network host is demonstrating anomalous behavior is ultimately a 
subjective judgment call. After network hosts are clustered across the observation period, 
we must quantitatively describe why a host is behaving normally or abnormally. This leads 
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us to the creation of a cluster analysis dataset which will describe how each network user 
is clustered over a given time period. This dataset will be the primary tool we use to detect 
behavioral anomalies. 
Foremost, we need to note the cluster in which a host appeared on each day over a 
given timeframe. This measurement also allows us to easily count the number of days a 
host was active on the network. If a host did not maintain enough presence on the network 
over the chosen timeframe, the sample size may be too small to declare the host’s behavior 
anomalous or normal. Figure 8 shows how we will track the cluster in which a host 
appeared on a given day by determining which cluster each host belongs to on each day 
and on how many days each host is active. 
    
Figure 8. Preliminary analysis showing host cluster membership 
The next two metrics we add to our cluster analysis help describe the level of 
consistent or inconsistent behavior a host is demonstrating despite how they may be 
hopping between clusters (in the case of Host B in Figure 8). For example, while Host C 
in Figure 9 appears to be hopping between clusters, one might conclude they are behaving 
consistently due to how they are hopping between the same two clusters. Whereas in the 
case of Host D in Figure 9, one might conclude they are behaving abnormally due to their 
membership in several different clusters. Denoting the number of hops and number of 
unique clusters, as shown in Figure 9, describes these phenomena.  
 
Figure 9. Cluster analysis example 
Again, using Figures 8 and 9 as the basis for our example, the next logical question 
may be how similar or dissimilar is Host C’s behavior to the other members of cluster 0 on 
8 Feb? Is Host C considered an outlier in cluster zero relative to the other hosts in cluster 
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0? Is Host C close to the cluster 0 centroid relative to the other members of cluster 0? To 
help answer these questions, we use the sample silhouette score as a metric to determine 
whether the host’s behavior on a given day was appropriately clustered. In Figure 10 for 
example, Host C’s silhouette score on 8 Feb indicates it was likely appropriately placed in 
cluster 0, whereas Host D’s silhouette score on 8 Feb indicates it may have been 
inappropriately clustered in cluster 1 [39], [40]. 
 
Figure 10. Cluster analysis dataset with sample silhouette scores 
Apart from using feature selection to identify each cluster’s most discriminatory 
features, we have focused on how network hosts are clustered relative to themselves. While 
this is useful for establishing per-host baselines, we need to address how hosts are clustered 
over time relative to other network hosts. For example, in isolation it may seem peculiar if 
a host appears in the same cluster for four consecutive days, but then suddenly changes on 
the fifth day to cluster 6. However, this could be viewed as normal relative to the entire 
population of hosts if we observe 50% of the population shift to cluster 6 on the same day. 
Such a massive distribution shift of hosts among each respective cluster is likely due to an 
outside factor (e.g., a mandatory online training event in which most hosts must participate, 
or a shift in business working hours) and not an isolated shift in host behavior. While 
understanding the specifics of such factors or events is not critical for anomaly detection, 
it is important to capture how individual hosts react to the imposition of these outside 
factors or events. Using our previous example, if a host does not shift to cluster 6, this 
could be cause for further investigation. 
In order to reflect cluster distribution changes, and the significance of each host’s 
movement between clusters across days, we use a Markov chain to compute the relative 
probability of a host’s membership in a cluster on a given day. Given an observation period, 
a Markov chain calculates the probabilities of all the possible sequences of state changes. 
In machine learning, Markov chain models can be used to predict the most likely state 
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changes. In our case, cluster identifiers represent states. We consider the union of all 
possible clusters in a given period and note the percentage of hosts whom transitioned from 
one state to another. This allows us to measure the likelihood—or the suspiciousness—of 
a host’s cluster membership on a given day. Figure 11 uses a scaled-down example to show 
our methodology in analyzing how hosts move (transition) between clusters across three 
consecutive days. 
 
Figure 11. Markov chain network host cluster transitions 
Figure 12 attempts to demonstrate the differences between host-specific and 
population-relative metrics with a simple example featuring 2 clusters across 3 days with 
4 hosts. For population-relative metrics, Host T (triangle) would have the highest Markov 
probability because it follows the most likely transitions (as defined by the population) 
from 8 to 10 Feb. Host S (star) would likely have the highest silhouette score because it is 
consistently clustered close in proximity to its corresponding cluster’s centroid (solid black 
circles). For host-specific metrics, we might also say Host S conforms consistently with its 
established host baseline because it does not cluster hop and occupies 1 unique cluster for 
the entirety of the timeframe. Whereas Host T may not conform with its established per-
host baseline because it hops clusters twice and occupies 2 unique clusters. 
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Figure 12. Population-relative and host-relative metrics example 
The cluster analysis allows us to examine how a host is behaving relative to 
historical host trends and overall population trends. Examining the clusters themselves 
allows us to explain why a host or group of hosts is clustered in a given manner by 
describing the typical behavior demonstrated by the members of a given cluster. Given a 
sufficient observation period, our methodology allows us to derive both host-specific 
behavior baselines and the suspiciousness of a host’s behavior relative to the population. 
C. SUMMARY
This chapter described our methodology for extracting human and device behavior
from network traffic in order to detect behavioral anomalies potentially associated with 
insider threats. First, we described how we engineer tailored feature sets which separately 
characterize human and device behavior, and how we use unsupervised machine 
learning—specially the K-Means algorithm—as the basis for detecting behavioral 
anomalies. We discussed the cluster metrics we use to describe how K-Means clusters 
network hosts, and the measurements we derive to form host-specific baselines and 
compare hosts to the population of hosts.  
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IV. SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION 
This chapter introduces a system framework that implements the methodology we 
discussed in Chapter III. This chapter also discusses how our system contends with large 
packet capture (PCAP) files to engineer the host-specific feature vectors, and how the 
unique nature of our dataset impacts our intended use of unsupervised machine learning 
clustering techniques to describe a host’s activity 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Our proof-of-concept system is designed to extract human and device behavior 
from large PCAP files and detect behavioral anomalies in accordance with the 
methodology we described in Chapter III. The focus of our system is to precisely 
characterize the behavior demonstrated by humans and devices on a network, and to extract 
this behavior in the form of descriptive feature vectors. In this section, we will introduce 
and discuss how we designed and implemented such a system. Figure 13 provides a broad, 
high-level overview of our system’s components and functionality. 
    
Figure 13. System components and functionality 
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In order to test our system on traffic from an operational network, we coordinated 
with the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Information Technology and Communications 
Service (ITACS) center to facilitate the collection of network traces in the form of PCAP 
files. On our behalf ITACS established a 10Gbps network tap that recorded approximately 
5.5TB of PCAP files—nearly all the traffic that originated and ended inside the network 
over a 7-day timeframe. This tap recorded only the first 70 bytes of each packet; payloads 
were discarded. Of note, while the resulting PCAP had a non-zero packet loss during 
periods of high traffic volume, we assess this loss to be sufficiently low to test our proof-
of-concept system. 
B. NETWORK TRAFFIC PROCESSING AND BEHAVIOR EXTRACTION 
The network traffic collection consisted of hourly PCAP files, with the maximum 
amount of network traffic per day totaling 919GB. In order to scale our system’s 
functionality to this volume, we utilized NPS’s High Performance Computer (HPC), the 
Hamming Supercomputer (HSC). To process the PCAP files, the behavior extraction 
module (Figure 13) operates on 24 PCAPs (1 day) at a time. Figure 14 depicts how we 
leveraged the parallelism offered by the HSC to transform arbitrary chunks from a PCAP 
file and reassembled them to form time-of-day, time interval, and country vectors. 
   
Figure 14. Processing network traffic in parallel 
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Run_pipeline() automates the behavior extraction module by utilizing the Slurm 
cluster management and scheduling software on the HSC [41]. After splitting hourly PCAP 
files into manageable sized fragments, the pcap_to_csv() component parses the PCAP 
fragments and extracts the required data to create each set of feature vectors for all observed 
NPS hosts. All observed TCP and UDP packet are represented in an intermediary state by 
a line with seven attributes, as shown in Figure 15. Packets utilizing other protocols are 
discarded. 
 
Figure 15. Intermediary TCP and UDP packet representations 
While observing other protocols may be potentially useful (particularly for 
characterizing device behavior), our behavior extraction methodology requires port 
information as described in Chapter III. Furthermore, due to their dominance in our 
network traces—and in Internet traffic holistically—TCP and UDP packets provide the 
volume needed to precisely characterize behavior [42]. 
After mining the seven required attributes, the concat_pkts() component groups the 
packet representation files by hours 0 to 23 and the vectorize() component (Appendix A) 
transforms them into the respective time-of-day, time interval, and country feature vectors 
files. In order to reduce the number of columns and the overall dimensionality of the 
resulting feature vectors, vectorize defines a set of destination countries and a set of 
destination ports that are used consistently as features. As a result, each network host is 
characterized using common destination ports and countries. For the country feature 
vectors, the vectorize() component creates the set of destination countries by including all 
resolvable destination countries from a given day. Vectorize() utilizes MaxMind GeoIP to 
lookup the destination country for each destination IP address, discarding those that cannot 
be resolved and grouping the remaining destination countries in a designated bin [43]. 
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For the time-of-day and time interval feature vectors, using all possible destination 
ports would result in 1,572,840 columns in the time-of-day feature vector files, and 
13,041,465 columns in the time interval feature vector files. Given the number of network 
hosts we are considering each day, the resulting dimensionality would impose impractical 
computational costs in processing the data and detecting anomalies. Consequently, the 
system is currently designed to utilize the top-12 most frequently used ports during the 
observation period, but is adjustable to support any percentage or number. Ports that are 
not part of the top-12 are binned together and represented in the feature set. Specifically, 
for the time interval feature vectors, the time interval columns are logarithmically spaced 
from 0 seconds to 960 seconds (15 minutes) in order to capture transmission behavior at a 
granular level.   
Of note, the current implementation of our system processes a larger than average 
daily network trace in approximately 8 hours on the HSC. Vectorize() is particularly costly, 
taking about 6 hours to run to completion under the current resource constraints on the 
HSC. While our implementation was not focused on performance, this is clearly a 
limitation in the context of insider threat detection. Ideally, such an insider threat detection 
system would be able to detect behavior anomalies in near real time, alerting analysts and 
security personnel as soon as possible. Admittedly, additional programming techniques and 
frameworks (several were discussed in Chapter II) could have been implemented in our 
system to speed-up our implementation. 
C. CLUSTERING NETWORK HOSTS AND ANOMALY DETECTION 
The feature vectors produced in the behavior extraction module enable efficient and 
rapid clustering and analysis of terabytes of PCAP files in the anomaly detection module. 
The anomaly detection module generates the data and context necessary to identify 
anomalous host behavior. As described in Chapter III, in order to detect behavioral 
anomalies, the anomaly detection module seeks to evaluate a host’s behavior against the 
population’s behavior. Determining a host’s cluster membership, the number of unique 
cluster’s they occupy, and their number of cluster transitions (hops) could also be useful in 
deriving host baselines over a given timeframe. Determining and evaluating host silhouette 
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scores and Markov chain probabilities is useful in understanding a host’s behavior relative 
to the population. Predictably, the conciseness of these evaluations is dependent on the 
length of the observation period. For example, shorter time periods (on the order of 7 or 
less days) are likely insufficient to accurately form host behavior baselines. However, 7 
days is likely an insufficient duration for insider threat detection in an operational setting. 
In the absence of sufficient time to form representative host baselines, one would need to 
rely on the detection of behavioral anomalies relative to the population of network hosts. 
Considering the data at our disposal, we expect to rely more so on host silhouette scores 
and Markov chain probabilities to detect anomalous behavior. The data collection period 
resulted in 7-days’ worth of noncontiguous PCAP files. Table 2 summarizes the contiguous 
6-day portion of the data and provides important operational context for the purpose of 
insider threat detection. 
Table 2. Data collection overview 
Date 8 Feb 9 Feb 10 Feb 11 Feb 12 Feb 13 Feb 








479 498 490 484 519 526 
This table provides an overview of the data we will use to test our system and imparts the 
feasibility of detecting anomalous behavior for the purpose of insider threat detection to include 
forming representative host behavior baselines. “DHCP Hosts” and “Static Hosts” show the 
number of active DHCP leased or statically assigned IP addresses on each respective day. 
 
The noncontiguous nature of our test data demonstrates several benefits and 
challenges we may experience in detecting behavior anomalies. The mix of week and 
weekend days allows us to infer network-wide and host-specific trends demonstrated on 
working and non-working days. Furthermore, 6 consecutive days of observation (8 through 
13 Feb) allows the formation of at least partially representative host baselines. However, 
the lack of repeated same-day observations (with the exception of 8 and 15 Feb) do not 
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allow us to compare host-specific behavior demonstrated on specific days of the week. 
Also, the lack of a fully contiguous observation period (no collection on 14 Feb) denies us 
from measuring cluster transition probabilities to 15 Feb with a Markov chain. 
Based on our chosen methodology and nature of our data, we assess our system 
needs at least 2 days of observation to identify potentially anomalous behavior. In fact, 
with the exception of silhouette scores, the metrics our system utilizes are practically 
irrelevant without at least 2 days of observation. As a result, we intend to evaluate our 
system over the 6 days of continuous capture (8 through 13 Feb). Considering the 
population-relative metrics we intend to use, we assess our chosen methods lend 
themselves more so to detecting anomalies across a contiguous timeframe.  
While not attributed to the nature of the data at our disposal, evaluating hosts whom 
are using DHCP-leased addresses presents another challenge in our analysis. Depending 
on the leasing period enforced by the network (e.g., wireless DHCP addresses change daily, 
wired DHCP addresses change less often), we should expect DHCP-leased addresses to be 
used by different hosts on a daily basis. As a result, behavior from leased addresses over a 
period of time may appear erratic in our analysis whereas in reality it could be behavior 
demonstrated by several different hosts. We expect this to be particularly true as it applies 
to leased wireless addresses. However, we expect leased addresses assigned to wired 
devices to change infrequently—particularly within the short period represented in our 
data. For this reason, when identifying hosts whom appear to be demonstrating anomalous 
behavior, we evaluate leased and static addresses differently, and further differentiate wired 
and wireless leased addresses. We have chosen to evaluate static and wired DHCP-leased 
hosts with the assumption that the wired DHCP-leased hosts will seldomly be assigned a 
new IP address during the 6-day observation period. This assumption is based on our 
experience using the network. Furthermore, we assess the few new IP address assignments 
to wired DHCP-leased hosts that occur during the observation period will negligibly alter 
our results. 
Broadly, the anomaly detection module (as shown in Figure 12) combines feature 
vectors of a single type across a chosen time period and clusters network hosts using the 
K-Means algorithm after determining the ideal number of clusters in the num_clusters() 
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component using silhouette scores. It subsequently attempts to characterize the outputted 
clusters according to their most descriptive features in the characterize_clusters() 
component. Characterizing the outputted clusters is not done specifically for the purpose 
of anomaly detection. Instead, cluster characterization allows us to understand why clusters 
are formed in a given manner and determine the descriptiveness of the clusters’ top features 
in order to gain operational insight. 
As described in Chapter III, the get_stats(), get_silohouette_scores(), and 
markov_chain() components compute the number of cluster transitions, the number of 
unique clusters occupied, the sample silhouette scores, and Markov chain probabilities for 
a single host over a given timeframe. In order to reduce the number of 0% probability 
cluster transitions, we use a different K-Means model in the markov_chain() component 
from the model used in the get_silouhette_scores() and characterize_clusters() component. 
We reduce the k in K-Means model used to produce cluster transition probabilities so it 
does not exceed 8. In cases where the num_clusters() component selects a k smaller than 
8, we use the k selected by num_clusters(). In cases where the outputted k from 
num_clusters() exceeds 8, we must consider the Markov transition probabilities in isolation 
without the context provided by characterize_clusters(). 
The silhouette score computed for each host for each day are averaged to provide a 
single representative value for how closely hosts are related to their assigned cluster. The 
apply_thresholds() component identifies the most suspicious hosts by filtering hosts with 
the lowest Markov chain probabilities and mean silhouette scores. To a lesser degree, the 
number of host cluster transitions and unique clusters occupied are also considered. 
D. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we introduced our system design. Our system design implements 
our methodology and successfully contends with the real-world challenges associated with 
working with network traffic and machine learning to identify potential behavioral 
anomalies associated with insider threats. Specifically, we discussed details regarding 
scaling our system to process terabytes of real-world network traces, and the challenges 
and solutions associated with dealing with high-dimension feature vectors. Lastly, we 
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outlined how we intend to test our system across the 6-day period of contiguous network 
activity, and how we intend to deal with hosts with leased versus statically assigned IP 
addresses. 
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V. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
This chapter presents and discusses the system’s results. First, we provide an 
analysis of the system’s results in respect to network hosts and clusters. Next, we present 
a series of case studies where we seek to explain why a host is indeed behaving 
anomalously when the system flags a host as such. 
A. OVERVIEW 
This section states and examines several broad, network-wide conclusions we can 
draw using our behavior extraction methodology. In short, we provide a holistic view of 
the network’s behavior—in some cases digging deeper to explain our conclusions.  
As described in Chapter IV, the data at our disposal encompasses a 7-day, 
noncontiguous period. In order to test the system in a realistic manner, and ensure the 
Markov chain is utilized as intended, we chose to test the system over the contiguous period 
from 8 to 13 Feb. Also, for the sake of the Markov chain metrics, we have chosen to 
evaluate DHCP network hosts that were active for all days in the chosen period under the 
assumption that most DHCP hosts do not change IP addresses during the 6-day observation 
period (and those that do change will negligibly alter our results).  
1. Host Analysis 
The system observed 8,838 unique IP addresses over the 6-day observation period. 
537 were hosts with statically assigned addresses, 3,305 were hosts with DHCP wireless 
addresses, and 4,996 hosts had DHCP wired addresses. Figure 16 shows that most of the 
hosts were active for all days of the observation period. Assuming most of the wireless 
subnet hosts are not on campus Saturdays and Sundays, it is expected that the majority of 
the wireless hosts were active on all 4 of the weekdays we observed.  
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Figure 16. Host activity 
Figures 17 and 18 show the network-wide most prevalent packet interevent times 
and port usage according to the average population host over the observation period. The 
top-5 interevent times are dominated by small ranges—the smallest possible range (0.0–
1.1x10-6 seconds) being the most prevalent. As shown in Figure 24, the Server Message 
Block (SMB) protocol over port 445 is most prevalent. The SMB protocol facilitates file 
sharing and is commonly used on typical intranets. Of note, in Figure 18 we have excluded 
the other binned ports the system did not enumerate. The average population host sent 
approximately 22,000 packets over other destination ports during the observation period. 
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Figure 17. Average population host interevent analysis 
 
Figure 18. Average population host destination port usage 
With the selected number of k clusters for the time-of-day feature vectors being 
double the k that was selected for the time interval feature vectors, it is expected that the 
time-of-day hosts are more likely to occupy a higher number of clusters throughout the 
period. As shown in Figure 19, the greatest proportion time-of-day hosts occupy 6 distinct 
clusters throughout the observation period. Whereas the greatest proportion of time interval 
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hosts occupy 1 distinct cluster throughout the observation period. Again, commensurate 
with k, country vector hosts never occupied more than 3 distinct clusters. 
 
Figure 19. Clusters occupied CDF 
Similar to Figure 19, Figure 20 shows time-of-day hosts were most likely to change 
their cluster membership (cluster hop) the maximum amount of times (5 transitions for a 
period of 6 days), whereas time interval hosts were most likely to never hop clusters 
throughout the observation period. In isolation, the number of unique clusters a host 
occupies or the number of times a host changes cluster membership reveals behavior 
variance, but is not particularly useful for the purpose of insider threat detection without 
additional context. A host’s corresponding Markov chain probability and mean silhouette 
score computed over the observation period provides context which allows us to determine 
the significance of host cluster movement. For example, if not rationalized by population-
relative metrics which characterize the population’s behavior (in our case, Markov chain 
probabilities), a host changing cluster membership could be significant. Host-relative 
metrics could also help explain cluster movement. In this case, having host-unique 
baselines could help justify cluster movement if the movement is consistent with a host’s 
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past behavior. However, we assess our 6-day observation period is insufficient for 
developing host-unique behavior baselines. The lack of repeated same-day observations 
(i.e., multiple Monday observations) in our data and the data’s brevity hinder our ability to 
build host-unique behavior baselines. As a result, we will rely on the context provided by 
Markov chain probabilities and mean silhouette scores to drive the identification of 
behavioral anomalies. 
 
Figure 20. Cluster hops CDF 
Figures 21 and 22 show the cumulative distributions of mean silhouette scores and 
Markov chain probabilities for the data. These graphs are the basis for the 
apply_thresholds() component in the system’s anomaly detection module.  Our system 
selects the hosts with the lowest scores (1%) as potentially anomalous and flags them for 
further investigation. The highest-scoring flagged time-of-day hosts (in theory, 
demonstrating the least anomalous behavior of the flagged hosts) have a mean silhouette 
score of 0.3051 and a Markov chain probability of 9.64x10-7, respectively. The 
corresponding time interval hosts have a mean silhouette score of 0.1962 and a Markov 
chain probability of 5.17x10-8, respectively. Finally, the corresponding country vector 
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hosts have a mean silhouette score of 0.6900 and a Markov chain probability of 2.09x10-5, 
respectively.      
 
Figure 21. Mean silhouette scores CDF 
 
Figure 22. Markov chain probabilities CDF 
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2. Cluster Analysis 
We use silhouette scores to determine the ideal number of clusters. Figure 23 shows 
the average silhouette scores for 4 to 150 clusters per each feature vector type. In order to 
limit the number of clusters (k), we select the highest scoring k less than or equal to 70. In 
the case of the time-of-day vectors, only marginally higher silhouette scores are achieved 
over k=40 We describe the clusters from each feature vector type separately using the 
cluster analysis methodology (characterize_cluster() component) described in Chapter III 
in the following paragraphs. 
 
Figure 23. Average silhouette scores per feature vector type 
Table 3 summarizes the 65 clusters for the time-of-day feature vectors. 60 of the 
65-top scoring (most discriminative) features for each cluster were unique, which shows 
significant cluster diversity. The decision tree metrics (described in Chapter III) show how 
well a decision tree can classify hosts from a given cluster using a one-versus-all strategy. 
The metrics from each cluster’s decision tree are averaged below in Table 3. 
50 
Table 3. Time-of-day cluster analysis 
Cluster distribution 
Largest cluster (hosts) 5563 
Smallest cluster (hosts) 106 
Median cluster size (hosts) 435 
Mean cluster size (hosts) 642.22 
Cluster distinctiveness 
(decision tree metrics) 
Mean accuracy 0.995 
Mean precision 0.919 
Mean recall 0.920 
As designed, the clusters’ top scoring features allow us to characterize a given 
cluster’s hosts. For example, cluster 17’s top-3 features include port 53 during hours 16, 
17, and 18. Figure 24 shows the comparatively high port 53 usage associated with hosts in 
cluster 17, likely driven by a relatively high number of DNS queries during working hours. 
Figure 24. Cluster 17 DNS activity 
In addition to providing information about preferred network services, as expected 
the time-of-day feature vectors allow us to infer a sense or daily schedule and rhythm. For 
example, observing the per-hour network activity in Figure 25 generated by hosts in the 
51 
wireless subnet shows a clear circadian rhythm. We assess the majority of hosts in the 
wireless subnet are humans and not purely automated devices. Adding 8 hours to the values 
shown on the x-axis in Figure 25 shows local pacific standard time. 
Figure 25. Activity patterns of hosts in the wireless subnet 
Table 4 summarizes the 27 clusters for the time interval feature vectors. Twenty-
two of the 27-top scoring features for each cluster were unique. In accordance with its 
design, the time interval features allow us to differentiate between clusters primarily 
comprised of mostly automated hosts demonstrating device behavior, and clusters 
primarily comprised of hosts controlled by humans which demonstrate human behavior. 
For example, as shown in Figure 26, cluster 19 hosts demonstrate repeated activity in one 
particular time interval. This potentially indicates higher levels of automation in cluster 19 
hosts. In Figure 27, we contrast the distribution of activity among the wireless subnet’s 
top-5 intervals to cluster 19’s respective (different) top-5 intervals. Assuming hosts in the 
wireless subnet are controlled by humans and demonstrate lower levels of automation, as 
we might expect the wireless subnet’s activity is more evenly distributed compared to 
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cluster 19. As shown in Figure 27, the proportion of cluster 19’s activity in its top interval 
nearly doubles the wireless subnet’s activity in its top interval. This activity allows us to 
assume cluster 19 is primarily comprised of hosts with higher levels of automation. 
Table 4. Time interval cluster analysis 
Cluster distribution 
Largest cluster (hosts) 5021 
Smallest cluster (hosts) 122 
Median cluster size (hosts) 1139 
Mean cluster size (hosts) 1546.07 
Cluster distinctiveness 
(decision tree metrics) 
Mean accuracy 0.987 
Mean precision 0.926 
Mean recall 0.922 
Figure 26. Cluster 19 interevent analysis 
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Figure 27. Interval distribution CDF 
Table 5 summarizes the 5 clusters for the country feature vectors. Only 3 of the top-
5 scoring features for each cluster were unique. Initial indications suggest the current 
design of the country features vectors is not advantageous for behavioral anomaly 
detection. One observation that could help explain this is that the vectors are particularly 
skewed with the vast majority of packets and data being sent to destinations in the United 
States as shown in Figure 28.  
Table 5. Country cluster analysis 
Cluster distribution 
Largest cluster (hosts) 32936 
Smallest cluster (hosts) 67 
Median cluster size (hosts) 214 
Mean cluster size (hosts) 6879.20 
Cluster distinctiveness 
(decision tree metrics) 
Mean accuracy 0.997 
Mean precision 0.972 




Figure 28. Top country feature vector destinations 
B. CASE STUDIES 
The primary objective of the following case studies is to determine if our 
methodology is effective in identifying behavioral anomalies. Second, through these case 
studies we hope to achieve an understanding of the advantages and disadvantages offered 
by each feature vector type in identifying behavioral anomalies. Third, we will seek to 
understand which population-relative metric (mean silhouette scores and Markov chain 
probabilities) is more effective in identifying behavioral anomalies. 
In the following case studies, we select and examine hosts the system has flagged 
as potentially anomalous. Specifically, we select one flagged host from each feature vector 
type for further investigation in an attempt to determine if indeed they are demonstrating 
anomalous behavior. The mean silhouette scores and Markov chain probabilities are the 
first indicator that a host could be behaving anomalously relative to the population of 
network hosts. However, we use a variety of techniques in the following case studies in 
order to assess whether a flagged host is behaving anonymously or not. Our techniques 
include host subnet identification and examination, observing movement in and/or between 
clusters, and observing the raw network traffic generated by a host. We primarily examine 
the hosts’ features which led to it being flagged. For example, we examine per-hour activity 
and port usage for the time-of-day hosts. However, we circumstantially examine other 
characteristics if they appear relevant to an assessment of the host in question. 
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Perhaps most importantly, these metrics and observations are always compared to 
the population-relative metrics. We also (at times) compare a host to the hosts in its subnet 
to provide additional operational context—especially when the subnet’s purpose is known 
and understood. When possible, we attempt to account for how a particular host is behaving 
compared to how it has behaved in the past. However, given the duration and composition 
of our data, we consider host-relative metrics to be less relevant. 
1. Time-of-Day Feature Vectors – Host A
Host A was flagged by the system due to its low Markov chain probability. As 
shown in Figure 29, Host A earned the lowest Markov chain probability and a mean 
silhouette score of 0.4466 which is at the 14th percentile of all observed hosts. Of note, the 
next lowest Markov chain probability was 1.08x10-9—significantly higher than Host A’s. 
Figure 29. Host A’s cluster analysis 
Examining Host A’s cluster movement (reflecting erratic behavior) helps explain 
its low Markov chain probability. However, while other hosts had 5 hops and occupied 
6 unique clusters, none had a lower Markov chain probability. From this we can conclude 
Host A made exceedingly unlikely cluster transitions across the observation period—as 
shown in Figure 29. Figure 30 helps further explain Host A’s low Markov chain probability 
and its unlikely transitions. Figure 30 shows Host A’s contradictory activity patterns using 
volume. With the exception of the 8th to the 9th and the 12th to the 13th, Host A’s activity 
increases when the population’s mean decreases and vice versa. Particularly noticeable is 
Host A’s divergence from the population from the 9th to the 10th where on the 10th Host 
A’s activity differs from the population mean by approximately 20,000 packets. 
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Figure 30. Host A’s volumetric activity patterns compared to the population 
While Figure 30 shows Host A’s volumetric inconsistencies relative to the 
population, we must address the other metrics accounted for in the time-of-day feature 
vectors. Host A also appears to be behaving anonymously based on time metrics. Figure 
31 shows Host A’s per-hour activity across the entire observation period compared to the 
population’s mean activity. There are spikes in activity from Host A during hours 0, 1, 7, 
and 11. However, perhaps most striking is Host A’s divergent activity between hours 17 
and 21 — one of the population’s lowest activity periods. 
  
Figure 31. Host A’s per-hour activity compared to the population 
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Using the information gleaned from both Figures 30 and 31, we can examine Host 
A’s activity on the 10th during hours 17 through 21 compared to the population mean on 
the 10th during the same hours. As shown in Figure 32, (showing differences in per-hour 
activity between the 9th and 10th) the activity exhibited by Host A during hours 17 through 
21 does significantly differ from the population mean. However, Figure 32 also shows stark 
differences during other hours on the 9th and 10th. Furthermore, Figure 32 also reveals 
possible host-relative anomalies in Host A’s behavior. Without a Host A behavioral 
baseline to refer to with repeated same-day observations, we cannot claim this is a host-
relative behavioral anomaly, but inconsistencies during hours 8 through 17 on the 9th 
compared to the 10th, as well as the spike in traffic following a period of low traffic 
volume, do warrant further investigation. 
  
Figure 32. Host A’s per-hour activity compared across days 
Host A divergences concerning port usage are less stark, highlighting the 
sensitively of our methods to temporal behavior rather than port behavior. More specificity 
in the ports we enumerated, specifically the ports grouped together in the “other” column 
in the time-of-day feature vectors, could have resulted in more telling results. However, 
closer examination of Host A’s most frequently utilized ports—binned other ports and 
445—compared to the populations yields notable results. Examining Host A’s overall port 
activity compared to the population shows that Host A uses port 445 significantly more. 
Looking at this activity per-hour shows more striking results. Figure 33 shows Host A’s 
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sharp increase in port 445 activity between hours 15 and 20 while the population’s mean 
port 445 activity decreases. Also, while Host A’s other port activity increase aligns with 
the population increase, it increases well above that of the population. 
 
Figure 33. Host A port activity compared to the population 
We have shown that Host A, at times, demonstrated anomalous behavior relative 
to the population of network hosts. However, this is in comparison to a population that 
contains a wide range of device types (servers, printers, phones, etc.). Comparing Host A 
to other hosts in its subnet may reveal differences that are either location or device specific. 
We observed activity from at least 460 other hosts in Host A’s subnet, and 12 of the 40 
hosts flagged by the system for low Markov chain probabilities were members of Host A’s 
subnet. Based on this information, it is possible an unusual subnet-wide event prompted 
the subnet to behave unusually during the observation period. Figures 34 and 35 help 
explain Host A’s anomalous activity. Figure 34 shows synchronized activity changes with 
the exception of the 12th to the 13th. Figure 35 also shows mostly synchronized activity 
shifts on an hourly basis between Host A and the subnet mean. The similar activity shifts 
between consecutive hours and consecutive days could indicate a shared pattern or event 
that influences the entire subnet’s (including Host A) activity. 
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Figure 34. Host A’s daily activity compared to its subnet 
 
Figure 35. Host A’s per-hour activity compared to its subnet 
This does not explain the greater volume demonstrated by Host A compared to the 
subnet mean—particularly between hours 17 and 21. Host A has the resoundingly lowest 
Markov chain probability and has a mean silhouette score in the 26th percentile of all 
subnet hosts. Port usage could help explain this, drawing a distinction between the subnet’s 
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behavior. As shown in Figure 36, while port 445 and port 443 activity is similar, Host A 
has significantly more other port activity, and less port 22 activity.  
  
Figure 36. Host A’s port activity compared to the subnet 
We have shown that Host A’s behavior is significantly different from the 
population of network hosts during the observation period. Shear activity levels (based on 
volume) between Host A and the population contradict one another on a daily and hourly 
basis. We have also shown that while Host A and its subnet have mostly corresponding 
daily and hourly activity patterns, Host A’s port utilization and volume is significantly 
different from its subnet. 
2. Time Interval Feature Vectors – Host B 
Host B was flagged by the system due to its low mean silhouette score. Host B has 
the lowest mean silhouette score of all the flagged time interval hosts. As seen in Figure 
37, Host B appeared in the same cluster on all days in the observation period, resulting in 
0 cluster hops. Despite this lack of cluster movement and consistent behavior, its Markov 
chain probability appears below the mean (0.4230) of other hosts that had 0 cluster hops. 
Of note, Host B consistently appears in a large cluster that does not appear to be very well 
defined. This is potentially a result of the fact that K-means places all points into a specified 
number of clusters, sometimes resulting in grouping of samples despite potential 
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dissimilarities. Cluster 13’s most discriminating features allowed the system to correctly 
classify 90% of cluster 13 hosts—well below the 98% average of all time interval feature 
vector clusters. For additional context, we were provided information that Host B is in a 
subnet used for energy management controllers associated with heating, ventilation, and 
air conditioning on campus. We observed activity from 57 other hosts in this subnet. These 
57 hosts appear in in cluster 13 more than any other cluster. 
 
Figure 37. Host B cluster analysis 
Given this context and the unique nature of Host B, we might expect its behavior 
to be vastly different from the behavior of the population. Furthermore, given cluster 13’s 
lack of distinctive features compared to other clusters, we should expect more variability 
in behavior from hosts in cluster 13. For these reasons, it is unlikely that comparisons 
between Host B and the population, or Host B and other hosts in cluster 13 will be useful 
from an insider threat perspective. However, this likely indicates that Host B is indeed 
demonstrating anomalous behavior in respect to the population and cluster 13. 
As suspected, Host B’s behavior significantly differs from the population. Figure 
38 shows Host B is significantly less active than the population’s average host. It also 
shows its top-5 intervals do not intersect with those of the population’s average host. Of 
note, Host B’s top-5 interevent periods are all larger than the population’s top-5 interevent 
periods. Regarding port utilization, Host B exclusively uses ports outside of the top ports 
we enumerated. Through the same methodology, we find that the average cluster 13 host 
is more similar to the population’s average host than Host B—demonstrating a similar 
activity level and having the same top-2 interevent periods as the population. 
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Figure 38. Host B top-5 interevent periods compared to the population 
While not accounted for in the time-interval feature vectors, we are able to find 
similarities between Host B and population per-hour activity patterns. As already stated, 
the activity levels relative to volume are significantly different, but Host B and the 
population are both least active during hour 18 as shown in Figure 39. 
  
Figure 39. Host B’s per-hour activity compared to the population 
Despite some similarities in Host B’s per-hour activity, it is clear that Host B 
demonstrated anomalous behavior relative to the population. And based on its mean 
silhouette score, it is also an outlier in respect to its cluster. However, in this case, Host B’s 
identity as an energy management controller partly explains why it is behaving differently 
and why it was subsequently flagged by our system. Given it its unique nature, we would 
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have to rely on a more direct comparisons with other subnet members or itself (host-
relative) to determine if it is perhaps an insider threat.   
Figure 40 shows Host B exhibits similar per-day activity patters across the 
observation period. Notably, Host B exhibits less activity than the average host from its 
subnet. The other notable exception is Host B’s behavior from the 8th to 9th. The subnets 
port utilization does not lend any insight to explain this exception—like Host B, subnet 
hosts also exclusively use other ports we did not enumerate. 
 
Figure 40. Host B’s volumetric activity patterns compared to its subnet 
Figure 41 helps us understand the differences in behavior from the 8th to the 9th. 
Considering the otherwise low activity levels on the 9th, the subnet’s mean per-hour 
activity spikes during hours 10 and 14. While this could be cause to investigate other hosts 
in the subnet, it does not show Host B is behaving anonymously relative to its subnet.  
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Figure 41. Host B’s per-hour activity compared across days 
Like Host A, we have shown that Host B’s behavior is significantly different from 
the population of network hosts during the observation period. Comparing Host B’s 
behavior with the behavior of other hosts in its cluster also explains its low mean silhouette 
score and why it was flagged by the system. Host B’s unique identity on the network as an 
energy management controller explains its anomalous behavior relative to the population 
and its cluster. We identified several behavior differences between Host B and its subnet. 
First, Host B consistently demonstrates less per-day and per-hour activity; second, Host B 
communicates at different rates, notably with many more large packet time intervals. In the 
processes of examining Host B we found an anomalous spike in activity from members of 
Host B’s subnet on the 9th—activity spikes on a day (Sunday) where we would expect less 
activity driven by humans on the network. 
Host B is indeed behaving anonymously relative to the population and perhaps 
relative to its subnet. Without additional operational context and information, we cannot 
conclude Host B is a strong candidate to investigate further as a possible insider threat. 
Given Host B unique role in the network, comparisons with the population are likely less 
meaningful. A host-relative approach for identifying behavioral anomalies would likely be 
more effective for Host B. 
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3. Country Feature Vectors – Host C 
Host C was flagged by the system for having a low Markov chain probability. As 
shown in Figure 42, Host C occupied 3 of the 5 total clusters and hopped 3 times. Only 
approximately 3% of the hosts we evaluated (not wireless and active for all 6 days) hopped 
3 or more times, and 0.2% occupied 3 or more unique clusters. Host C also has a below 
average mean silhouette score. These measurements alone suggest that Host C is an outlier.  
 
Figure 42. Host C cluster analysis 
We immediately notice in Figure 43 that while Host C communicates more often 
with destination addresses in the United States, it sends a disproportionate amount of data 
to destination addresses in Canada: Host C sends an average of approximately 2,121 bytes 
per packet to destination addresses in Canada and it sends approximately 148 bytes per 
packet to addresses located in the United States. Table 6 compares bytes/packet ratios per 
destination country between Host C, the population, and Host C’s subnet across the entire 
observation period (total bytes / total packets from 8–13 Feb). Host C sends significantly 
more data to destination addresses in Canada than the subnet and population mean. 
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Figure 43. Host C destination countries 
Table 6. Destination bytes/packet ratios 
 United 
States 
Canada Ireland UK Hong 
Kong 
Germany Japan 
Host C 148 2,120 537 824 632 43 602 
Population 701 323 523 477 791 84 748 
Subnet 793 93 690 567 619 44 587 
 
Upon closer inspection, we noticed that Host C actually sends less data to 
destination addresses in Canada than the subnet and population mean on every day in the 
observation period except for the 10th and 13th. Figure 44 shows a clear spike on the 10th. 
 
Figure 44. Host C bytes/packet ratio to Canada  
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While not as severe, Host C demonstrates anomalous activity concerning data sent 
to destination addresses in the United States. In Figure 45 we see Host C’s mean bytes per 
packet to the United States fall well below population and subnet-relative norms. 
 
Figure 45. Host C byte/packet ratio to the United States 
Figure 46 shows the total amount of data (bytes) Host C sends per day compared to 
the average host from both Host C’s subnet and the population. The spike on the 10th in 
Figure 44 is clearly reflected in the overall total and surpasses average subnet and 
population hosts. 
 
Figure 46. Mean bytes sent per day 
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This spike is likely the reason for Host C’s hop to cluster 4 from the 9th to the 10th 
(Figure 42). This transition is unlikely—0.37% probability. However, according to our 
cluster analysis, hosts in cluster 4 are foremost identified based on the amount of data they 
send to destination addresses in Canada. Despite only 0.39% hosts occupying cluster 4 on 
at least one day during the observation period, there is a noticeable network phenomenon 
that is causing 1 of only 5 clusters to be formed based on the amount of data sent to 
destination addresses in Canada. However, upon closer inspection of the other 27 hosts that 
occupy cluster 4 on at least one day, they do not appear to share this defining feature. Figure 
47 shows the average host in cluster 4 does send more data to destination addresses in 
Canada on the 11th, but not nearly the amount Host C sends on the 10th. This possibly 
indicates that due to the similarity of the country feature vector hosts—as a result of the 
sparseness of the dataset—cluster 4 was formed to accommodate hosts that do not broadly 
share the common similarities of the other hosts in clusters 0-3. Again, this is likely a result 
of K-means forming a fixed number of clusters and grouping dissimilar samples. 
  
Figure 47. Host C bytes sent to Canada compared to cluster 4 hosts 
It appears that Host C is behaving anonymously compared to the average 
population, subnet, and cluster 4 host. We uncovered this anonymous behavior by 
examining the amount of data sent to destination addresses in Canada during the 
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observation period. Interestingly, the country feature vectors (possibly due to their sparsity) 
were clustered in such a way that a small number of abnormal hosts were isolated in a small 
abnormal cluster (cluster 4). While our cluster analysis methodology indicates data sent to 
Canada is a defining characteristic of cluster 4, none of the 28 hosts — except Host C — 
seem to have this characteristic. This possibly indicates that the feature vector’s sparsity 
— in this case — is an advantage for anomaly detection. Due to the vast majority of hosts 
demonstrating similar behavior in terms of activity directed toward destinations in the 
United States, K-means appears to have isolated a few anomalous hosts that do not 
demonstrate this prevalent behavior. 
C. DISCUSSION 
In this chapter, we first provided an overview of how each dataset (time-of-day, 
time interval, and country feature vectors) was clustered. Second, we surveyed the 
population of network hosts in order to establish behavioral norms within the network. 
Third, we chose an outlier host for each feature vector type and conducted a case study on 
each to determine in what ways the host’s behavior diverged from the population and its 
subnet during the observation period. 
As demonstrated in the case studies, each feature vector type described the hosts’ 
behavior in a different way (as designed), and as a result, we were able to recognize 
different behavioral anomalies based on each feature vector type. In the case studies, we 
found that outliers based on one feature type are also outliers based on the others, 
suggesting the feature vector types are complementary. Practically speaking, this means it 
is generally useful to apply the insights and clues all three feature types rather than just one 
or two. Having said this, under our current design each type provides different advantages 
and disadvantages as they relate to behavioral anomaly detection for the purpose of insider 
threat detection. 
The time-of-day feature vectors were more comprehensive and easier to understand 
than the other feature vector types. As shown in Figure 23, the time-of-day feature vectors 
tolerated the selection of a higher k. Resultantly, we were able to segregate hosts into 
smaller, more defined groups. This allowed us to characterize host behavior (in an 
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understandable way) on a given day based on its cluster membership. Furthermore, 
engineering the features based on hourly activity allowed for interpretable results. 
Preliminary results suggest that further enumerating ports grouped in the “other” column 
would have increased the anomaly detection power of these feature vector types. Our 
results also indicate that the time-of-day feature vectors will likely miss host behavioral 
anomalies caused by automated processes that do not follow hourly routines (like humans 
do). As discussed in Chapter III, this was an intentional design and is further evidence that 
the feature vector types are complementary. 
The time interval feature vectors were designed for the detection of device 
(automated) behavioral anomalies at a granular level. Our initial observations indicate that 
the time interval vectors could be immensely powerful for behavioral anomaly and insider 
threat detection if the right analytical framework is developed and applied. Such a 
framework should focus on exploiting the time interval feature’s discriminatory power and 
understanding the granular detail they offer for behavioral anomaly detection. A 
disadvantage to the time interval feature vectors is that without the right framework, they 
are difficult to interpret. Ideally in insider threat detection we want to be able to point out 
why a host is behaving anomalously, and anomalies based on time interval behavior are 
generally not as interpretable as time-of-day behavior. Given the mix of human and 
automated activity on many hosts (making it difficult to separate the two), we believe this 
feature vector type would be beneficial for host fingerprinting and the subsequent 
development of host-relative baselines, which this research largely did not address. 
The country feature vectors were designed to characterize human-to-device 
behavior. As discussed in Host C’s case study, the skewed activity directed toward 
destinations in the United States surprisingly helped us identify a small group of misfit 
hosts who were behaving anomalously. However, this skewed distribution of activity 
would typically be undesirable for machine learning, and in our case did not allow 
widespread and fine-grained behavior characterization. This means while we were able to 
identify the most anomalous hosts, there were likely false negatives our system did not 
flag. On the other hand, one could argue this is desirable in an operational context—only 
flag the most anomalous hosts so human analysts are not overwhelmed with false positives. 
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A design improvement to how the system enumerates destinations (e.g., using destination 
cities or counties instead of countries) could have reduced sparseness and increased its 
detection effectiveness.  
The case studies revealed an interesting relationship between the Markov chain 
probabilities and silhouette scores: the hosts flagged for having the lowest silhouette scores 
had very little cluster movement—most occupied 1 unique cluster and had 0 hops. 
Additionally, they usually were consistently clustered day-to-day on the periphery of a 
given cluster. This explains why (as was the case for Host B), the hosts flagged for their 
silhouette scores were unique relative to the population. This is favorable for behavioral 
anomaly detection. However, we suspect these hosts demonstrated consistent abnormal 
behavior because of their unique roles on the network, and not because they were insider 
threats. Fully enumerating the advantages and disadvantages of each metric would likely 
reveal further insights on their applicability to insider threat detection. Likewise, host-
relative metrics could be used to evaluate these hosts for insider threat activity. 
While mean silhouette scores appeared to be more effective in detecting repeated 
abnormal population-relative behavior, the Markov chain probabilities appeared to be 
effective in detecting behavioral anomalies as a result of dynamic or new emerging 
behavior. As seen with Host A and Host C, the Markov chain was useful in detecting 
changes in behavior that were different from the population (i.e., “spikes”). If we presume 
behavioral anomalies as a result of behavior change are indicative of insider threats, the 











THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
73 
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This chapter summarizes the research conducted, draws conclusions from this 
work, identifies limitations, and discusses opportunities for future work.  
A. SUMMARY 
This thesis described a system that extracts host and organizational behavior from 
network traffic and detects behavioral anomalies using machine learning techniques for the 
purpose of insider threat detection. We developed and tested the system by using real-world 
network traffic collected on NPS’s operational network over a contiguous 6-day period. 
The system we developed extracts host and organizational behavior form TCP  
and UDP network traffic in the form of feature vectors using temporal measurements, 
volumetric measurements, and destination examination. We developed and engineered 
three different feature types; time-of-day features for describing human behavior, time 
interval features for describing device behavior, and destination country features which 
characterize human-to-device behavior. The system leverages the parallelism offered by 
the HSC at NPS to process several terabytes of real-world network traffic to create per-
host feature vectors of each type. 
The system’s anomaly detection module uses the K-Means unsupervised machine 
learning algorithm to cluster network hosts and examine cluster membership over the 
contiguous time period. The system specifically accounts for hosts with statically assigned 
IP addresses and wired hosts with DHCP-leased IP addresses. Wireless hosts on the 
network are not accounted in our analysis. The anomaly detection module uses silhouette 
scores and a Markov chain to examine host conformity to network trends as defined by the 
population of active network hosts. The system flags the hosts with the lowest mean 
silhouette scores and Markov chain probabilities calculated over the observation period. 
We selected three hosts flagged as anomalous by the system and conducted case 
studies to determine if indeed they behaved anomalously during the observation period. 
Furthermore, we examined the advantages and disadvantages of the three different types 
of feature vectors in order to determine which was better suited for behavioral anomaly 
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detection. Lastly, we examined the advantages and disadvantages of mean silhouette scores 
and Markov chain probabilities as population-relative metrics. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
The system flagged the lowest scoring 1% of hosts based on their Markov chain 
probability and mean silhouette score for each feature vector type. An exhaustive approach 
to determine if all flagged hosts were indeed behaving anomalously would have resulted 
in over 200 individual case studies and ground truth data which was not available. Although 
we did not produce a complete confusion matrix to determine the system’s effectiveness, 
all three case studies suggest that the subject hosts did behave anomalously during the 
observation period relative to the population. It is unknown whether this anomalous 
behavior was the result of benign or insider threat activity. 
Given that each feature vector type accounts for different kinds of activity, we 
assess their use is complementary and their success is codependent for effective behavioral 
anomaly detection. However, we have pointed out areas for improvement: the system could 
be more effective if it enumerates more destination ports for the time-of-day or time 
interval feature vectors; and the country vectors are rather sparse and heavily skewed, 
resulting in inadequate host characterization. Furthermore, the power of the time  
interval feature vectors to detect behavioral anomalies based on device automation  
remains untapped without more robust analysis methods. Considering analytical 
comprehensiveness and ease of interpretation, we consider the time-of-day feature vectors 
to be the most effective host characterization method. 
The case studies suggest the two population-relative metrics our system uses for 
measuring conformity are also complementary. We assess silhouette scores are best suited 
to detect static behavioral anomalies—hosts that consistently demonstrate population-
relative anomalous behavior. Only 1 of the 30 hosts with the lowest mean silhouette scores 
occupied more than 1 cluster during the observation period. Host B consistently behaved 
anomalously relative to the population likely due to its unique identity and functionality in 
the energy management controller subnet. The Markov chain probabilities are best suited 
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for detecting emerging and perhaps longer-term behavioral anomalies which cause a host 
to move between clusters.  
Host B serves as an example why silhouette scores and Markov chain probabilities 
are complementary for the purpose of insider threat detection. Consider the following 
hypothetical scenario. Host B behaves anomalously due to insider threat activity at some 
point during a 20-day observation period. Perhaps it hops clusters 1 time due to the insider 
threat activity. If our detector used Markov chain probabilities in isolation, its probability 
would likely be too high to be flagged by our system. In this case, it would be a false 
negative. If the system used silhouette scores in isolation, it would be flagged but it would 
likely be disregarded as a false positive given proper operational context. With operational 
context and a detector that uses both metrics in a complementary fashion, an analyst (or 
host-relative metric) would hopefully realize that a cluster hop resulting in a higher Markov 
chain probability is unlikely specifically for Host B. 
C. FUTURE WORK 
Our system has several limitations that, if implemented in an operational insider 
threat detection system, would have to be contended with. Fortunately, we believe these 
limitations can be practically and reasonably resolved. 
1. System Efficiency 
While we did not precisely measure system performance as part of this research, it 
is apparent our system’s behavior extraction module is insufficient for keeping pace with 
the time requirements needed from an operational insider threat detector. In an operational 
context, insider threats must be urgently identified and addressed to minimize 
organizational damage.  With the current resource and scheduling restrictions on the HSC, 
our system took approximately 12 hours to extract host behavior in the manner described 
in chapter IV from the input PCAP files. Several potential solutions exist to increase the 
efficiency of the behavior extraction module. 
Remaining consistent with our current offline machine learning system design 
which extracts host behavior from batches of input PCAP files, one could attempt to 
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leverage a distributed storage and processing framework to speed-up the behavior 
extraction module. Apache’s open-source Hadoop software is such a framework [44]. 
While more complex than our system design, an online machine learning model operating 
on real-time data streams would provide even greater performance increases. Apache Spark 
could be a computing solution for implementing a comparable system with an online 
machine learning capability [45]. 
An alternate methodology for increasing system efficiency and providing a better 
real-time insider threat detector could be to examine different network activity timeframes. 
As currently implemented, our system processes and analyzes 24 hours worth of PCAP 
files at a time. Even with our current non-distributed offline model, we would likely 
observe significant speed-ups from operating on 1 or 2 hours worth of PCAP files at a time. 
However, such a solution would have to account for changes in feature vectors and 
potential changes in detection performance. 
2. Network Activity Timeframes 
Examining smaller network activity timeframes offers another opportunity to 
achieve smaller detection timelines, potentially without sacrificing detection accuracy. In 
this research we examined 6 days of contiguous network activity. While machine learning 
models often perform better when presented with more training data, this should be verified 
and possibly sacrificed for the sake of smaller detection times. For example, while 6 days 
of training data may provide marginally better detection results, perhaps another system 
design using 2 or 3 days of training data provides comparable detection results with 
significantly smaller detection times. In essence, our research did not address how much 
training data is required to reliably detect behavioral anomalies and insider threats. 
Quantifying the tradeoff between the length of observation period and detection accuracy 
would be beneficial from an operational standpoint. 
3. Population Activity Patterns 
We examined how hosts behaved within the population of network hosts to detect 
behavioral anomalies. This research does not address how the population behaves relative 
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to the population on a recurrent basis. Examining population behavioral anomalies across 
a broad timeframe could provide useful and important insights for insider threat detection. 
To address population-relative metrics, we used a Markov chain to examine the 
behavior of the population of network hosts on a given day, and how individual hosts 
behaved relative to the population. However, our methodology does not capture population 
behavior baselines or deviations from such a baseline. An understanding of how the 
population is expected to behave could help explain instances where hosts follow historical 
population activity patterns whereas the population reacts to new stimuli. We assess our 
current behavior extraction methodology lends itself to such an endeavor. 
Markovian analysis could also help measure and document population behavior 
over an extended timeframe. Furthermore, our methodology for examining distinct clusters 
and their unique features could help one understand which clusters they expect will form 
on the network on a given day. 
4. Host Activity Patterns 
This research did not address host-relative behavioral anomalies. An insider threat 
detection system that considers population-relative and host-relative metrics could be 
powerful. For example, host-relative metrics could be used to build detailed host baselines 
which profile a hosts’ hourly and interevent time patterns. As identified in this thesis, we 
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APPENDIX A.  VECTORIZE() COMPONENT 
""" 
VECTORIZE() COMPONENT 
Written by: Brett Rajchel 
 
Purpose: Create time-of-day,time interval and country feature vectors 
 
Input: A single CSV or directory of CSV files in the follwoing format 
 





Output: 3 CSV files. time-of-day, time interval, and country vectors 
 





import pandas as pd 




from multiprocessing import Process 
 
### Constants ### 
PORT_DIST = 0.6 
HPC_READ_PATH = str(sys.argv[1]) 
HPC_WRITE_PATH = str(sys.argv[2]) 
SLURM_I = int(sys.argv[3]) 
 
### Classes ### 
class smart_dict(dict): 
    def __missing__(self, key): 
        return key 
 
############################################### 
########## GENERAL/UTILITY FUNCTIONS ########## 
############################################### 
 
def get_top_ports(df, percentage=PORT_DIST, return_port_list=False): 
    ''' Returns a pd.DataFrame which excludes packets with dst_ports not in 
top x percent of all dst_ports. This should only be used with time-of-day and 
time-interval vector creation. if 'return_port_list' parameter is True, only 
returns a list of ports, and not the filtered pd.DataFrame. '''  
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    dist = df['dst_port'].value_counts(normalize=True) 
     
    counter = 0 
    wl = set() 
    for port, value in dist.items(): 
        if counter < percentage: 
            wl.add(port) 
            counter += value 
        else: 
            break 
 
    if return_port_list: 
        return wl 
    else: 
        result_df = df.query('dst_port in @wl') 
        return result_df 
 
def filter_top_ports(df, top_ports_set): 
    ''' Inputs are pd.DataFrame and a set of ports desired ports. Returns a 
filtered version of the input df with packets to ports in top_ports_set and 
packets to 'other' ports. It adds synthetic packets from src_ip "x.x.x.x" to 
ports in top_ports_set that do not appear as a dst_port in the input df. ''' 
 
    others_dict = smart_dict() 
    others = set(df['dst_port']) - top_ports_set 
    for other_port in others: 
        others_dict[other_port] = 'other' 
    df['dst_port'] = df['dst_port'].map(others_dict) 
 
    missing_top_ports = top_ports_set - set(df['dst_port']) 
    for port in missing_top_ports: 
        df = df.append({'time': 0.0, 'src_ip': 'x.x.x.x', 'dst_ip': 'x.x.x.x', 
'proto': 6, 'src_port': 4, 'dst_port': port, 'len': 10}, ignore_index=True) 
     
    return df 
 
def filter_top_countries(df, top_countries_set): 
    ''' Inputs are pd.DataFrame and a set of desired destination countries (as 
resolved by mmdb). Returns a filtered version of the input df with packets to 
countries in top_countries_set and packets to 'other' countries. It adds 
synthetic packets from src_ip "x.x.x.x" to ports in top_ports_set that do not 
appear as a dst_port in the input df. ''' 
 
    others_dict = smart_dict() 
    others = set(df['dst_country']) - top_countries_set 
    for other_country in others: 
        others_dict[other_country] = 'other' 
    df['dst_country'] = df['dst_country'].map(others_dict) 
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    missing_top_countries = top_countries_set - set(df['dst_country']) 
    for country in missing_top_countries: 
        df = df.append({'time': 0.0, 'src_ip': 'x.x.x.x', 'dst_ip': 'x.x.x.x', 
'proto': 6, 'src_port': 4, 'dst_port': 4,'dst_country': country, 'len': 10}, 
ignore_index=True) 
     
    return df 
 
def gen_vectors_by_file(file_path, filter_bool=False, ports_path='',  
countries_path=''): 
    ''' Call this function to get time-of-day, time-interval, and country 
vectors in csv format from a single CSV denoted by file_path. Setting 
filter_bool to True will ensure vectors are created uniformally from pre-
defined sets of countries and ports. If filter_bool is set to True, a ports_path 
and countries_path must be provided to .txt files containing the desired ports 
and destination countries. This function can be called by user or 
parallelize_gen_vectors. ''' 
 
    fname = os.path.basename(file_path) 
    name = fname.split('.')[0] 
 
    df = pd.read_csv(file_path) 
    df = df.replace([np.inf, -np.inf], np.nan).dropna(axis=0) 
    if not filter_bool: 
        top_ports_df = get_top_ports(df, PORT_DIST) 
    else: 
        ports_set = read_txt_to_set(ports_path, True) 
        countries_set = read_txt_to_set(countries_path, False) 
 
    # time-of-day vectors 
    if not filter_bool: 
        tod = gen_tod_vectors(top_ports_df) 
    else: 
        tod = gen_tod_vectors(df, ports_set) 
    dst_filename = HPC_WRITE_PATH + name + '_tod.csv' 
    tod.to_csv(dst_filename) 
 
    # time-interval vectors 
    if not filter_bool: 
        ti = gen_ti_vectors(top_ports_df) 
    else: 
        ti = gen_ti_vectors(df, ports_set) 
    dst_filename = HPC_WRITE_PATH + name + '_ti.csv' 
    ti.to_csv(dst_filename) 
 
    # country vectors 
    if not filter_bool: 
        cv = gen_country_vectors(df) 
    else: 
        cv = gen_country_vectors(df, filter_set=countries_set) 
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    dst_filename = HPC_WRITE_PATH + name + '_cv.csv' 




    ''' Used to generate ti, tod, and cv vectors in parallel from a set of 
CSVs, all in one directory. For use on Hamming HPC. ''' 
     
    file_list = os.listdir(path) 
    os.chdir(path)     
     
    ports_path = 
'/home/brett.rajchel/work/gitlab/thesis_code/feature_engineering/top_ports_12
feb.txt' 
    countries_path = 
'/home/brett.rajchel/work/gitlab/thesis_code/feature_engineering/top_countrie
s_12feb.txt' 
    gen_vectors_by_file(file_list[SLURM_I], True, ports_path, countries_path)  
 
def read_txt_to_set(txt_file_name, need_int): 
    ''' Reads a text file and returns set of items from the text file. With 
need_int parameter, user can define the type (int or str) or set members. ''' 
 
    return_set = set() 
    with open(txt_file_name, 'r') as filehandle: 
        filecontents = filehandle.readlines() 
        for line in filecontents: 
            # remove linebreak which is the last character of the string 
            port = line[:-1] 
            # add item to the set 
            if need_int: 
                return_set.add(int(port)) 
            else: 
                return_set.add(port) 
    return return_set 
 
################################# 




    ''' Helper function for gen_tod_vectors. Bins number of packets sent during 
from src_ip during 0-23 hours.''' 
    temp = ((df['time'] / 3600) % 24).astype(int) 
    temp2 = np.bincount(temp, minlength=24) 
    return pd.Series(temp2) 
 
def __rename_add_cols(df): 
    ''' Helper function for gen_tod_vectors. Creates and names columns needed 
for final df. ''' 
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    port = '_' + str(df.iloc[0]['dst_port']) 
    df.columns = ['src_ip', 'dst_port'] + [str(i) + port for i in range(24)] 
     
    return df 
 
def gen_tod_vectors(df, filter_set=None): 
    ''' Called to generate time-of-day feature vectors. If a filter_set is 
provided, it will only create column headers for the ports in the filter_set. 
''' 
 
    if filter_set is not None: 
        df = filter_top_ports(df, filter_set) 
 
    df = df.groupby(['src_ip', 'dst_port'], sort=False).apply(__bin_ports)     
    df = df.reset_index()   # get rid of MultiInxex so we can directly reference 
columns 
    df.columns = df.columns.astype(str) # make sure all column names are 
strings 
 
    df = df.groupby(['src_ip', 'dst_port'], 
sort=False).apply(__rename_add_cols)  # rename and add all nessecary columns 
     
    df = df.set_index('src_ip') # remove src_ip column and make it an index 
column 
    df = df.drop(['dst_port'], axis=1)  # drop dst_port columns 
    df = df.fillna(0)   # make sure all nans are 0 so we can add them accross 
groups 
     
    df = df.groupby('src_ip', sort=False).aggregate(np.sum) # combine rows 
with same src_ip by adding them 
 
    # remove dummy src_ip 
    if filter_set is not None: 
        df = df.query('src_ip != "x.x.x.x"') 
 
    return df 
 
################################### 
########## TIME INTERVAL ########## 
################################### 
 
def __gen_bins(start=0.000001, stop=900, num_bins=200): 
    '''Returns a list of logarithmically spaced numbers between start and stop 
(inclusive)''' 
 
    bins = np.logspace(np.log10(start), np.log10(stop), num=num_bins) 
    bins = bins.tolist() 
    bins.pop(0) 
    bins.insert(0, 0) 




    ''' Calculates interevent times between packets and bins them into 
logarithmically separated bins. ''' 
 
    bins = __gen_bins() 
    diff_lst = df['time'].sort_values(ascending=True).diff().tolist() 
    diff_lst.pop(0) 
    s = pd.cut(diff_lst, bins=bins).value_counts() 
    return s 
 
def __mult_columns(df): 
    ''' Defines column names as bin ranges for interevent times. ''' 
 
    port = '_' + str(df.iloc[0]['dst_port']) 
    new_cols = [] 
    cop = df.columns[2:] 
    for col in cop: 
        temp = col + port 
        new_cols.append(temp) 
    new_cols = ['src_ip'] + ['dst_port'] + new_cols 
    df.columns = new_cols 
    return df 
 
def gen_ti_vectors(df, filter_set=None): 
    ''' Main function to generate time-interval vectors. If a filter_set is 
provided, it will only create column headers for the ports in the filter_set.''' 
 
    if filter_set is not None:  #filter the df to only have the dst_port in 
filter_set 
        df = filter_top_ports(df, filter_set) 
     
    df = df.groupby(['src_ip', 'dst_port'], sort=False).apply(__bin_times) 
    df.columns = df.columns.astype(str) 
    df = df.reset_index() 
     
    df = df.groupby(['src_ip', 'dst_port'], sort=False).apply(__mult_columns) 
     
    df = df.set_index('src_ip') # remove src_ip column and make it an index 
column 
    df = df.drop(['dst_port'], axis=1)  # drop dst_port columns 
     
    df = df.fillna(0)   # make sure all nans are 0 so we can add them accross 
groups 
     
    df = df.groupby('src_ip', sort=False).aggregate(np.sum) # combine rows 
with same src_ip by adding them 
 
    # remove dummy src_ip 
    if filter_set is not None: 
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        df = df.query('src_ip != "x.x.x.x"') 
 
    return df 
 
############################# 
########## COUNTRY ########## 
############################# 
 
def __resolve_ips(df, del_not_resolved, return_set): 
    ''' This function returns the df with the dst_country column. Optional to 
remove df rows where dst_country could not be resolved with del_not_resolved 
set to True. Can also be used to return the set of dst_countries in the df if 
return_set is set to to True. IMPORTANT - "reader" variable must include the 
path to a valid mmdb. ''' 
     
    hamming_path = 
'/home/brett.rajchel/work/gitlab/thesis_code/mmdb/GeoLite2-
Country_20200225/GeoLite2-Country.mmdb' 
    dgx_path = '/home/brett.rajchel/Documents/thesis_code/mmdb/GeoLite2-
Country_20200225/GeoLite2-Country.mmdb' 
    local_path = '/Users/brettrajchel/Documents/thesis_code/mmdb/GeoLite2-
Country_20200225/GeoLite2-Country.mmdb' 
    reader = geoip2.database.Reader(hamming_path) 
 
    loc_dict = dict()   # store ips which have already been looked up 
loc_dict[ip] = country 
    num_not_resolved = 0    # number of times an ip can not be resolved 
    not_resolved = set()    # the ips which cold not be resolved 
    new_col = []    # this will become the 'dst_country' column 
 
    for ip in df['dst_ip']: 
        if ip in not_resolved:  # if the ip is a previously seen ip that cannot 
be resolved 
            num_not_resolved += 1 
            new_col.append('not_resolved') 
            continue 
         
        if ip not in loc_dict:  # if ip has NOT already been seen and recorded 
- we need to look it up 
            try: 
                response = reader.country(ip) 
            except Exception as e:  # first time seeing this ip and it CANNOT 
be resolved 
                not_resolved.add(ip) 
                num_not_resolved += 1 
                new_col.append('not_resolved') 
            else:   # first time seeing this ip and it CAN be resolved 
                area = response.country.name 
                loc_dict[ip] = area # add it to the dict 
                new_col.append(area) 
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        else:   # we have seen this ip before - look it up in dict 
            new_col.append(loc_dict[ip]) 
 
    if return_set: 
        result = set(new_col) 
        result.discard('not_resolved') 
        return result  
 
    df['dst_country'] = new_col 
    # remove not 'not_resolved' rows (or not) 
    if del_not_resolved:    
        result_df = df[df.dst_country != 'not_resolved'] 
        return result_df 
    else: 
        return df 
 
def __prepare(df, pkts): 
    ''' Enables half of the DF to count pkts, and the other half to counts 
bytes. Names columns accordingly. ''' 
    df = df.reset_index() 
 
    if pkts: # if processing number of pkts df 
        df = df.pivot(index='src_ip', columns='dst_country', values='time') 
        df.columns = [col + '_pkts' for col in df.columns] 
    else: # if processing number of bytes df 
        df = df.pivot(index='src_ip', columns='dst_country', values='len') 
        df.columns = [col + '_bytes' for col in df.columns] 
     
    df = df.reset_index() 
    df = df.fillna(0) 
 
    return df 
 
def gen_country_vectors(df, del_not_resolved=True, return_set=False, 
filter_set=None): 
    ''' The function generates country vectors. If a filter_set is provided, 
it will only create column headers for the countries in the filter_set.''' 
     
    df = __resolve_ips(df, del_not_resolved, return_set) 
 
    if filter_set is not None:  #filter the df to only have the dst_countries 
in filter_set 
        df = filter_top_countries(df, filter_set) 
 
    grouped = df.groupby(['src_ip', 'dst_country'], sort=False) 
 
    pkts = grouped.count() 
    vol = grouped.sum() 
 
    pkts = __prepare(pkts, True) 
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    vol = __prepare(vol, False) 
 
    df = pkts.merge(vol, on='src_ip') 
 
    # remove dummy src_ip 
    if filter_set is not None: 
        df = df.query('src_ip != "x.x.x.x"') 
 
    df = df.set_index('src_ip') 
     
    return df 
 
########################## 
########## MAIN ########## 
########################## 
 
if __name__ == "__main__": 
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APPENDIX B:  CLUSTERING() COMPONENT 
""" 
CLUSTERING() COMPONENT 
Written by: Brett Rajchel 
 
Purpose: Run the clustering pipeline as described in "Machine Learning 
Techniques for Insider Threat Detection" thesis chapter IV 
 
Input: A single CSV containing time-of-day, time interval, OR country feature 
vectors across a given timeframe. A "date" column must exist in the CSV if 
multiple more than one of the same source_ip's exist. vectorize.py does not 
account for the "date" column. 
 
Output: A single CSV file for each input CSV of the following form: 
source_ip, <day1>, <day2>, <dayN>, num_hops, num_clusters, days_active, 
mean_silhouette_score, address_type, markov_probability 
""" 
 
import pandas as pd 









import matplotlib.pyplot as plt 
import matplotlib.cm as cm 
from itertools import product, permutations 
from sklearn.preprocessing import normalize 
from sklearn.metrics import silhouette_samples, silhouette_score 
from sklearn.cluster import DBSCAN 
from scipy.cluster.hierarchy import dendrogram 
from sklearn.cluster import AgglomerativeClustering 
from sklearn.tree import DecisionTreeClassifier 
from sklearn.ensemble import ExtraTreesClassifier 
from sklearn.feature_selection import SelectFromModel 
from sklearn.feature_selection import VarianceThreshold 
from sklearn.feature_selection import SelectKBest, chi2, f_classif, 
f_regression 
from sklearn.model_selection import train_test_split 
from sklearn.metrics import accuracy_score 
from sklearn.metrics import recall_score 
from sklearn.metrics import precision_score 
from sklearn.metrics import f1_score 
from multiprocessing import Process 
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##### CONSTANTS ##### 





HPC_VECTORS_WRITE_DIR = '/home/brett.rajchel/work_new/markov_data/' 
DGX_VECTORS_WRITE_DIR = '/home/brett.rajchel/Documents/thesis_code/vectors/' 








########## GENERAL FUNCTIONS ########## 
####################################### 
 
def d_tree(train_data, train_labels, test_data, test_labels, ret_str=True): 
    ''' Implements a basic decision tree. Takes as input training and test 
sets with their respective labels. If ret_str is set to True (default), returns 
results in the form of a format string for easy writing. Else, prints results 
to stdout. ''' 
     
    tclf = DecisionTreeClassifier() 
    tmodel = tclf.fit(train_data, train_labels) 
    tpred = tmodel.predict(test_data) 
 
    taccuracy = round(accuracy_score(test_labels, tpred), 4) 
    tprecision = round(precision_score(test_labels, tpred, average='macro'), 
4) 
    trecall = round(recall_score(test_labels, tpred, average='macro'), 4) 
     
    # for .txt output 
    if ret_str: 
        acc_str = 'DTree accuracy = {}, '.format(taccuracy) 
        prec_str = 'DTree precision = {}, '.format(tprecision) 
        rec_str = 'DTree recall = {}'.format(trecall) 
 
        ret_str = acc_str + prec_str + rec_str 
        return ret_str 
    else:   # print results to stdout 
        print('DTree accuracy = %f' %taccuracy) 
        print('DTree precision = %f' %tprecision) 
        print('DTree recall = %f' %trecall) 
 
def univariate_fs(data, cluster_labels, k_num): 
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    ''' Univariate feature selection. Removes all but the k_num highest scoring 
features. Returns the dataset with only the top k_num features and a set of 
the top five features''' 
 
    old_cols = data.columns 
 
    sel = SelectKBest(chi2, k=k_num).fit(data, cluster_labels) #chi2 is one 
way to rank features 
    new_data = data[data.columns[sel.get_support(indices=True)]] 
     
    test2 = zip(old_cols[sel.get_support()], sel.scores_[sel.get_support()]) 
    ordered = sorted(test2, key=lambda x: x[1], reverse=True) 
    for m in ordered: 
        ordered2 = [(l, int(c)) for l, c in ordered] 
 
    return (new_data, ordered2) 
 
def encode_one_vs_all(cluster_labels, one): 
    ''' Prepares dataset labels for one-vs-all classification analysis. The 
"One" labels do not change. The "All" labels are changed to 99. Returns the 
encoded labels. ''' 
     
    encoded_labels = [] 
    for label in cluster_labels: 
        if label == one: 
            encoded_labels.append(one) 
        else: 
            encoded_labels.append(99) # is dummy value for "all" 
    return encoded_labels 
 
def normalize_df(df): 
    ''' Simple function which returns normalized data in a pd.DataFrame. ''' 
 
    cols  = df.columns 
    ind = df.index 
    return pd.DataFrame(normalize(df), index=ind, columns=cols) 
 
def markov_chain(df, day_list, num_clusters, typ, nans=False, 
drop_existing=False): 
    ''' Implements a simple Markov Chain. It calculates the probability of 
each possible state transition, and calculates the product of all src_ip 
transitions accross a given time period specified by day_list. Probabilities 
are calculated using all DHCP wired hosts and applied to all hosts (static, 
DHCP leased wired, DHCP leased wireless). Returns a pd.DataFrame with a new  
probabilities column with src_ip's who were active for all days specified in 
the day_list parameter. ''' 
     
    fd = open(HPC_VECTORS_WRITE_DIR + 'markov_trans_{}.txt'.format(typ), 'w') 
 
    # error checking - day_list must be passed as list of strings 
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    if not all(isinstance(item, str) for item in day_list):  
        print('Days must be passed as a list of strings') 
        sys.exit(1) 
 
    # used to encode cluster id's (states) 
    map_dict, state_str = __blank_dict(num_clusters) 
    num_days = len(day_list) 
     
    # filters only src_ip's active for all days in day_list 
    ifnot nans: 
        df = df.query('days_active == @num_days') 
     
    wired_df = df.query('src_ip in @MM_SET') 
    wired_df = wired_df[day_list].fillna(-1) 
    wired_df = wired_df.astype(int) 
    wired_df = wired_df.replace(map_dict) 
    wired_num_rows = wired_df.shape[0] 
    wired_num_cols = wired_df.shape[1] 
    wired_list = wired_df.values.tolist() 
     
    full_df = df[day_list].fillna(-1) 
    full_df = full_df.astype(int) 
    full_df = full_df.replace(map_dict) 
    full_df_num_rows = full_df.shape[0] 
    full_df_num_cols = full_df.shape[1] 
    full_df_list = full_df.values.tolist() 
     
    # get all possible transitions and instantiate needed dicts 
    state_transitions = product(state_str, repeat=2) 
    state_transitions = [''.join(x) for x in state_transitions] 
    state_dict = dict((el, 0) for el in state_transitions)  # all possible 
transitions - {ab: 0, aa: 0} 
    total_dict = dict((el, 0) for el in state_str)  # accounts for the number 
of all transitions from a single state {a: 0, b: 0} 
 
    # get raw number of transitions  
    for row in range(wired_num_rows): 
        for ele in range(wired_num_cols - 1): 
            cur_next = wired_list[row][ele] + wired_list[row][ele + 1] 
            cur = wired_list[row][ele] 
             
            state_dict[cur_next] += 1   # {ab: 34, aa: 15} 
            total_dict[cur] += 1    # {a: 100, b: 34} 
 
    ## error checking - makes sure number total transitions is correct - checks 
total_dict ## 
    true_num_transitions = (wired_num_cols - 1) * wired_num_rows 
    actual_num_transitions = sum(total_dict.values()) 
    if true_num_transitions != actual_num_transitions: 
        print('The number of transitions is incorrect - total_dict is wrong') 
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        print('Should have {}, but have found {}'.format(true_num_transitions, 
actual_num_transitions)) 
        sys.exit(1) 
 
    ## more error checking - checks state_dict ## 
    test_val = sum(state_dict.values()) 
    if true_num_transitions != test_val: 
        print('The number of transitions is incorrect - state_dict is wrong') 
        print('Should have {}, but have found {}'.format(true_num_transitions, 
test_val)) 
        sys.exit(1) 
 
    # calculates percentages vice totals in state_dict 
    for key, value in state_dict.items(): 
        first = key[:1] 
        total = total_dict[first] 
        try: 
            state_dict[key] = value / total 
        except ZeroDivisionError:   # this will apply if no users were clustered 
in a given cluster 
            state_dict[key] = 0 
            print('No evaluated users were clustered in {}'.format(first)) 
            fd.write('No evaluated users were clustered in 
{}\n'.format(first)) 
     
    # save transitions in the .txt 
    for k, v in state_dict.items(): 
        num = '' 
        for char in k: 
            t = str(ord(char) - 97) 
            num += t 
        fd.write('{} -- {}\n'.format(num, v)) 
     
    ## more error checking - checks to makes sure the calculated percentages 
are correct ## 
    total_pct = len(state_str) 
    actual_pct = sum(state_dict.values()) 
    diff = abs(total_pct - actual_pct) 
    if diff > 0.1: 
        print('The calculated percentages are wrong in the state_dict') 
        print('Should have ~{}, but found {}'.format(total_pct, actual_pct)) 
 
    # calculates the product of all transitions over the given time period 
given in day_list 
    new_col = [] 
    for row2 in range(full_df_num_rows): 
        score = [] 
        for ele2 in range(full_df_num_cols - 1): 
            cur_next = full_df_list[row2][ele2] + full_df_list[row2][ele2 + 1] 
            score.append(state_dict[cur_next]) 
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        new_col.append(np.prod(score)) 
 
    if drop_existing:   # used for recalculation 
        df = df.drop(['9_prob', '10_prob', '11_prob', '12_prob', '13_prob', 
'15_prob', 'mean_prob'], axis=1) 
     
    df['markov_prob'] = new_col 
     
    fd.close() 
    return df 
 
def __blank_dict(num_clusters): 
    ''' Helper function for markov_chain(df, day_list, num_clusters, 
nans=False, drop_existing=False) ''' 
     
    chars = 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz̀ ~!@#$%̂ &*()-=_+[]|}{;:<>?,./' 
    state_str = chars[:num_clusters] 
    map_dict = dict() 
    clusters = [i for i in range(num_clusters)] 
    for i in range(len(clusters)): 
        map_dict[i] = chars[i] 
    return (map_dict, state_str) 
 
def label_source(): 
    ''' Label source master_nps csvs. For use on the HPC. ''' 
 
    index = int(sys.argv[1]) 
    fd = MASTER_NPS_DATA_LIST[index] 
 
    ### format write name ### 
    bname = os.path.basename(fd) 
    typ = bname.split('_')[1] 
    no_extension = bname.split('.')[0] 
    write_name = '{}_labled.csv'.format(no_extension) 
    write_path = HPC_VECTORS_WRITE_DIR + write_name 
 
    data = pd.read_csv(fd) 
    data = data.set_index(['src_ip', 'date']) 
     
    # if it is the CV dataset, we need to normalize separately 
    if typ == 'cv':  
        ind = 0 
        for col in data.columns: 
            if col.split('_')[1] != 'bytes': 
                ind += 1 
            else: 
                break 
        pkts_df = data.iloc[:, :ind] 
        bytes_df = data.iloc[:, ind:] 
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        norm_pkts = normalize_df(pkts_df) 
        norm_bytes = normalize_df(bytes_df) 
        norm_df = norm_pkts.join(norm_bytes) 
    else: 
        norm_df = normalize_df(data) 
     
    k = IDEAL_K_DICT[fd] 
    ret = kmeans_model(norm_df, k) 
    mod = ret[0] 
    data['cluster'] = mod.labels_ 
     
    data.to_csv(write_path) 
 
###################################### 
########## CLUSTER ANALYSIS ########## 
###################################### 
 
def __analyze_cluster_movement(df, markov_mode, get_each_ss=False): 
 
    df_trad = df[['src_ip', 'date', 'cluster']] 
    df_trad = df_trad.groupby(['src_ip'], sort=False).apply(__basic_stats) 
    df_trad = df_trad.reset_index(drop=True) 
 
    if markov_mode: 
        return df_trad 
     
    else: 
        if get_each_ss: 
            df_new = df[['src_ip', 'date', 'ss']] # use this for __get_all_ss() 
            df_new = df_new.groupby(['src_ip'], 
sort=False).apply(__get_all_ss) 
        else: 
            df_new = df[['src_ip', 'ss']]   # use this for __get_mean_ss() 
            df_new = df_new.groupby(['src_ip'], 
sort=False).apply(__get_mean_ss) 
            df_new = df_new.rename(columns={0: 'mean_ss'})  # use this for 
__get_mean_ss() 
            df_new = df_new.reset_index() #use for __get_mean_ss() 
 
        result = df_trad.merge(df_new, on=['src_ip']) 
        return result 
 
def __get_mean_ss(df): 
    ''' Returns the mean ss for each src_ip calculated accross all days. ''' 
     
    mean_val = df['ss'].mean() 




    ''' Private function called by analyze_cluster_movement (df, write_path). 
''' 
     
    df = df.pivot(columns='date', values='ss') 
    df.columns = [str(col) + '_ss' for col in df.columns] 
    return df 
 
def __basic_stats(df): 
    ''' Private function called ny analyze_cluster_movement(df, write_path). 
''' 
     
    df = df.sort_values(by='date') 
    diff = (df['cluster'].diff().dropna() != 0).sum() 
    num_clusters = len(df['cluster'].unique()) 
    days_active = df['cluster'].count() 
     
    df = df.pivot(index='src_ip', columns='date', values='cluster') 
    df = df.reset_index() 
 
    df['num_hops'] = diff 
    df['num_clusters'] = num_clusters 
    df['days_active'] = days_active 
    return df 
     
def get_cluster_stats(df): 
    ''' Gets broad cluster stats from the following columns and prints them to 
stdout: "days_active," "num_clusters," and "num_hops." ''' 
     
    num_days = df['days_active'].value_counts(normalize=True).round(3) 
    for days, counts in num_days.items(): 
        print('%f percent IPs were active %i days'%(counts, days)) 
 
    num = df['num_clusters'].value_counts(normalize=True).round(3) 
    for num_clusters, counts in num.items(): 
        print('%f percent IPs occupied %i different clusters'%(counts, 
num_clusters)) 
 
    num_hops = df['num_hops'].value_counts(normalize=True).round(3) 
    for hops, counts in num_hops.items(): 
        print('%f percent IPs hopped clusters %i times'%(counts, hops)) 
 
############################ 




def kmeans_model(data, num_clusters): 
    ''' Helper function which implements basic K-Means with a constant 
random_state parameter for K-Means model. Returns the model and the  cluster 
distribution. ''' 
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    model = KMeans(n_clusters=num_clusters, random_state=10).fit(data) 
     
    unique, counts = np.unique(model.labels_, return_counts=True) 
    test2 = dict(zip(unique, counts)) 




########## PIPELINES ########## 
############################### 
 
def __min_ss(data, desired_score=0.19, min_clusters=5): 
    ''' Helper function for the clustering_data_pipeline which finds the ideal 
number of clusters with a desired silhouette score of aleast desired_score. 
Returns the highest scoreing k_num with its corresponding score. ''' 
     
    silhouette_avg = 0 
    while silhouette_avg < desired_score: 
        clusterer = KMeans(n_clusters=min_clusters, random_state=10) 
        cluster_labels = clusterer.fit_predict(data) 
        silhouette_avg = silhouette_score(data, cluster_labels) 
 
        min_clusters += 1 
     
    return (min_clusters, silhouette_avg) 
 
def __top_ss(data, max_clusters, min_clusters=5): 
     
    score_dict = dict() 
    for n_clust in range(min_clusters, max_clusters + 1): 
        clusterer = KMeans(n_clusters=n_clust, random_state=10) 
        cluster_labels = clusterer.fit_predict(data) 
        silhouette_avg = silhouette_score(data, cluster_labels) 
 
        score_dict[n_clust] = silhouette_avg 
     
    score_list = sorted(score_dict.items(), key=lambda x: x[1], reverse=True) 
    return score_list[0] 
 
def cluster_data_pipeline(master_csv_path, write_path, markov_knum=5, 
days_list=ALL_DAYS, max_clusters=70, find_knum=None, label_orig=False): 
    ''' Overarching function for the pipeline. ''' 
 
    file_name = os.path.basename(master_csv_path) 
    file_no_extension = file_name.split('.')[0] 
    day_string = ''.join(days_list) 
    stat_fd = '{}_{}.out'.format(file_no_extension, day_string) 
 
    print('Cluster pipeline - %s' %file_name) 
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    raw_data = pd.read_csv(master_csv_path) 
    data = raw_data.query('date in @days_list') 
 
    data = data.set_index(['src_ip', 'date']) 
    data = data.drop(['cluster'], axis=1) 
     
    # if it is the CV dataset, we need to normalize separately 
    if file_no_extension.split('_')[1] == 'cv':  
        ind = 0 
        for col in data.columns: 
            if col.split('_')[1] != 'bytes': 
                ind += 1 
            else: 
                break 
        pkts_df = data.iloc[:, :ind] 
        bytes_df = data.iloc[:, ind:] 
 
        norm_pkts = normalize_df(pkts_df) 
        norm_bytes = normalize_df(bytes_df) 
        norm_df = norm_pkts.join(norm_bytes) 
    else: 
        norm_df = normalize_df(data) 
 
    if find_knum is None: 
        # get the ideal number of clusters based on the ss 
        num_score = __top_ss(norm_df, max_clusters) # returns a tuple 
(num_clusters, silhouette score) 
    else: 
        num_score = (find_knum, '<not evaluated - find_knum param was None>') 
    num_clusters = num_score[0] 
 
    mod, clust_dist = kmeans_model(norm_df, num_clusters) 
    markov_mod, not_used = kmeans_model(norm_df, markov_knum)   # kmeans model 
for markov_knum 
 
    if label_orig: 
        data['cluster'] = mod.labels_ 
        temp_write = DGX_DATA_DIR + file_no_extension + '_labeled.csv' 
        data.to_csv(temp_write) 
 
    characterize_cluster(norm_df, stat_fd, num_score, mod, clust_dist) 
     
    # get average ss, stats 
    ss_df = create_clusters_df(norm_df, mod) 
    m_df = create_clusters_df(norm_df, markov_mod, markov_mode=True) 
     
    # get markov score 
    m_df = markov_chain(m_df, days_list, markov_knum, 
file_no_extension.split('_')[1], nans=False, drop_existing=False) 
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    m_df.to_csv(HPC_VECTORS_WRITE_DIR + file_no_extension.split('_')[1] + 
'_mm.csv', index=False) 
    m_df = m_df[['src_ip', 'markov_prob']] 
 
    result = ss_df.merge(m_df, how='left', on=['src_ip']) 
    result.to_csv(write_path, index=False) 
 
    secondary_analysis(result, stat_fd) 
 
def create_clusters_df(df, mod, markov_mode=False): 
    ''' Intended to read a finalized feature vector csv (e.g. 
"master_tod_nps.csv). Returns a df with the cluster id associated with each 
sample/src_ip, the date the sample/ src_ip appeared on, and a "_ss" column 
column for each day showing the samples silhouette score. The type column shows 
if the src_ip is static or leased. ''' 
 
    df['cluster'] = mod.labels_ # add the cluster labels to the df 
 
    if not markov_mode: 
        ss = silhouette_samples(df, mod.labels_)    # get the sample silhouette 
scores 
        df['ss'] = ss   # add silhouette scores to the df 
 
    # trim the df 
    df = df.reset_index() 
     
    if not markov_mode: 
        df = df[['src_ip', 'date', 'cluster', 'ss']] 
    else: 
        df = df[['src_ip', 'date', 'cluster']] 
     
    result = __analyze_cluster_movement(df, markov_mode) # worker function 
 
    if not markov_mode: 
        # determine if the src_ip is dhcp leased wired or wireless, or static 
        result['type'] = result.apply(lambda row: 'static' if row.src_ip in 
ALL_STATIC else ('leased_wireless' if row.src_ip in ALL_NPS_WIRELESS else 
'leased_wired'), axis=1) 
    else: 
        result = result.drop(['num_hops', 'num_clusters'], axis=1) 
 
    result.columns = result.columns.astype(str) 
    result.columns = [col.strip() for col in result.columns] 
    return result 
 
def characterize_cluster(norm_df, txt_name, num_clusters_score, model, 
clust_dist): 
    ''' characterize_cluster analyzes the the calculated clusters and writes 
results to a file specified by txt_name. This function is currently configured 
for use in the clustering pipeline. It writes the cluster distribution, and 
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the top 5 cluster featues and corresponding cluster scores for each cluster. 
Using one-vs-all analysis, it uses a decision tree to judge the strength of 
the top 5 scoring cluster features. ''' 
    
 
    fd = open(HPC_VECTORS_WRITE_DIR + txt_name, 'w') 
 
    # write silhouette results 
    best_num_clusters = num_clusters_score[0] 
    best_cluster_score = num_clusters_score[1] 
    fd.write('Num clusters == {}, score == {}\n'.format(best_num_clusters, 
best_cluster_score)) 
 
    fd.write('Cluster distribution == {}\n'.format(clust_dist)) 
    fd.write('\n') 
 
    for i in range(best_num_clusters): 
        fd.write('##### START of cluster {} stats #####\n'.format(i)) 
        zero_labels = encode_one_vs_all(model.labels_, i) 
        fd.write('- Highest scoring features for cluster {}: \n'.format(i)) 
 
        data, top_5_scores = univariate_fs(norm_df, zero_labels, 5) 
        fd.write('-- {}\n'.format(top_5_scores)) 
         
         
        train_data, test_data, train_labels, test_labels = 
train_test_split(data, zero_labels, test_size=0.2, random_state=0) 
        ret3 = d_tree(train_data, train_labels, test_data, test_labels) 
        fd.write('- Decision tree metrics for cluster {}\n'.format(i)) 
        fd.write('-- {}\n'.format(ret3)) 
        fd.write('##### END of cluster {} stats #####\n'.format(i)) 
        fd.write('\n') 
     
    fd.close() 
 
def secondary_analysis(cluster_data_df, txt_name): 
    ''' Called by cluster_data_pipeline. This function appends additional stats 
to the characterize_cluster .txt file. The stats provide broad analysis of the 
computed dataset. Specifically, it examines type, num_ hops, num_clusters, the 
sample silhouette scores, and the markov probabilities accross the entire 
dataset. It also provides preliminary clues about which hosts could be 
anomalous. ''' 
     
    fd = open(HPC_VECTORS_WRITE_DIR + txt_name, 'a') 
 
    # examine cluster stats - the full dataset 
    fd.write('### Full dataset (not active all days) - {} 
###\n'.format(cluster_data_df.shape)) 
    num_days = 
cluster_data_df['days_active'].value_counts(normalize=True).round(3) 
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    for days, counts in num_days.items(): 
        fd.write('{} percent IPs were active {} days\n'.format(counts, days)) 
 
    num = 
cluster_data_df['num_clusters'].value_counts(normalize=True).round(3) 
    for num_clusters, counts2 in num.items(): 
        fd.write('{} percent IPs occupied {} different 
clusters\n'.format(counts2, num_clusters)) 
 
    num_hops = 
cluster_data_df['num_hops'].value_counts(normalize=True).round(3) 
    for hops, counts3 in num_hops.items(): 
        fd.write('{} percent IPs hopped clusters {} times\n'.format(counts3, 
hops)) 
    fd.write('\n') 
 
    cluster_data_df = cluster_data_df.set_index('src_ip') 
 
    # examine wired, wireless, static 
    typ = cluster_data_df['type'].value_counts().round(3) 
    for type_type, counts4 in typ.items(): 
        fd.write('{} IPs were {}\n'.format(counts4, type_type)) 
    fd.write('\n') 
 
    wireless = 'leased_wireless' 
    cluster_data_df = cluster_data_df.query('type != @wireless') 
    fd.write('##  Without wireless IPs ##\n') 
    fd.write('\n') 
 
    # more stats 
    mean_hops = cluster_data_df['num_hops'].mean() 
    fd.write('The mean num_hops == {}\n'.format(mean_hops)) 
    mean_unique = cluster_data_df['num_clusters'].mean() 
    fd.write('The mean number of unique occupied clusters == 
{}\n'.format(mean_unique)) 
    fd.write('\n') 
 
    # examine silhouette scores 
    ss = cluster_data_df['mean_ss']     
    fd.write('Silhouette score analysis:\n') 
    fd.write('- The median is {}\n'.format(ss.median())) 
    fd.write('- The mean is {}\n'.format(ss.mean())) 
    fd.write('- {} has the MIN score of {}\n'.format(ss.idxmin(), ss.min())) 
    fd.write('- {} has the MAX score of {}\n'.format(ss.idxmax(), ss.max())) 
 
    pct_1 = math.floor(len(ss) * 0.01) 
    ss_low = ss.sort_values().iloc[:pct_1] 
    fd.write('- The lowest 1 percent scores (IP, score):\n') 
    for ip, value in ss_low.items(): 
        fd.write('-- {}, {}\n'.format(ip, value)) 
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    fd.write('\n') 
    ss_low_ips = set(ss_low.index) 
     
    # examine markov probs 
    mp = cluster_data_df['markov_prob'] 
    fd.write('Markov probability analysis:\n') 
    fd.write('- The median is {}\n'.format(mp.median())) 
    fd.write('- The mean is {}\n'.format(mp.mean())) 
    fd.write('- {} has the MIN probability of {}\n'.format(mp.idxmin(), 
mp.min())) 
    fd.write('- {} has the MAX probability of {}\n'.format(mp.idxmax(), 
mp.max())) 
 
    pct_1 = math.floor(len(mp) * 0.01) 
    mp_low = mp.sort_values().iloc[:pct_1] 
    fd.write('- The lowest 1 percent probabilities (IP, score):\n') 
    for ip, prob in mp_low.items(): 
        fd.write('-- {}, {}\n'.format(ip, prob)) 
    fd.write('\n') 
    mp_low_ips = set(mp_low.index) 
 
    ip_int = mp_low_ips & ss_low_ips 
    fd.write('Intersecting IPs between low silhouette scores and low markov 
probs: {}\n'.format(ip_int)) 
 
    fd.close() 
 
 
def parallelize_type(day_list=CONTIG_DAYS, write_dir=HPC_VECTORS_WRITE_DIR, 
spec_clust=False, cluster_labels=False): 
    ''' This function calls the clustering pipline for all master_nps feature 
vectors for one day range (default is ALL_DAYS). For use on the HPC to leverage 
parallelism. ''' 
     
    if write_dir[-1:] != '/': 
        print('Not a correctly formatted write_dir') 
        sys.exit(1) 
     
    index = int(sys.argv[1]) 
    fd = 
['/home/brett.rajchel/work/new_data/master_cv_nps_labeled.csv'][index] 
 
    file_name = os.path.basename(fd) 
    file_no_extension = file_name.split('.')[0] 
    day_string = ''.join(day_list) 
    new_file_name = '{}_{}.csv'.format(file_no_extension, day_string) 
    write_path = write_dir + new_file_name 
 
    if not spec_clust:  # default 
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        cluster_data_pipeline(fd, write_path, markov_knum=5, 
days_list=day_list, max_clusters=50, find_knum=None, 
label_orig=cluster_labels) 
    else:   # not default 
        knum = IDEAL_K_DICT[fd] 
        cluster_data_pipeline(fd, write_path, markov_knum=5, 





########## MAIN ########## 
########################## 
 
if __name__ == "__main__": 
    start_time = time.time() 
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APPENDIX C:  TIME-OF-DAY CLUSTER ANALYSIS 
Cluster 1_Feature 1_Score 2_Feature 2_Score 3_Feature 3_Score 4_Feature 4_Score 5_Feature 5_Score Accuracy Precision Recall 
0 3_other 5009 4_other 4839 2_other 4652 1_other 4411 9_other 3983 0.9863 0.9686 0.9741 
1 20_443 8249 20_53 70 10_other 67 11_other 67 13_other 59 0.9933 0.9371 0.9333 
2 2_443 7356 3_443 462 1_443 212 6_443 130 10_443 70 0.9986 0.9862 0.9404 
3 4_445 2849 4_80 105 12_445 55 3_445 31 8_445 19 0.999 0.8845 0.9542 
4 10_other 11702 17_443 68 16_443 65 20_443 60 19_443 60 0.9986 0.99 0.9811 
5 13_80 13571 13_443 74 11_80 68 6_7680 22 1_7680 22 0.9996 0.9998 0.9545 
6 15_443 8723 15_53 70 15_80 38 10_other 33 11_other 31 0.9953 0.9243 0.9142 
7 16_443 8617 16_53 81 10_other 61 11_other 58 14_other 51 0.9905 0.9072 0.8977 
8 17_80 10312 17_8530 18 17_443 15 18_80 15 17_8014 11 0.9988 0.9208 0.9441 
9 11_other 10752 17_443 59 20_443 55 16_443 54 19_443 52 0.9986 0.9854 0.9801 
10 5_22 9214 6_22 9148 3_22 9054 13_22 8948 7_22 8912 0.9995 0.99 0.9965 
11 6_443 2208 7_443 2037 5_443 1874 9_443 1860 3_443 1807 0.9841 0.8488 0.873 
12 18_443 2196 19_443 1903 17_443 131 20_443 78 10_other 40 0.9952 0.9418 0.9185 
13 18_445 5395 19_445 200 17_445 75 20_445 22 21_445 10 0.9983 0.9024 0.9024 
14 6_other 5225 20_443 22 21_443 20 19_443 20 22_443 20 0.999 0.9595 0.9747 
15 13_other 9993 17_443 47 20_443 47 21_443 43 16_443 43 0.9995 0.9895 0.9963 
16 15_443 3172 16_443 946 17_443 208 15_53 52 10_other 32 0.9956 0.9279 0.8927 
17 17_53 1021 16_53 1005 18_53 805 21_53 802 23_53 695 0.9958 0.8885 0.8621 
18 14_other 9723 17_443 55 20_443 55 16_443 51 21_443 50 0.9995 0.992 0.992 
19 23_443 1827 0_443 905 22_443 828 21_443 475 20_443 228 0.9831 0.7975 0.8056 
20 15_other 7228 20_443 33 19_443 31 21_443 30 17_443 30 0.9989 0.9657 0.982 
21 12_other 7325 17_443 34 20_443 32 16_443 31 19_443 30 0.9986 0.978 0.97 
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22 21_443 7736 22_443 179 21_53 76 21_80 70 10_other 60 0.9945 0.953 0.9265 
23 16_445 5465 15_445 4232 17_445 694 18_445 227 23_445 192 0.9939 0.9195 0.9059 
24 22_445 5659 21_445 217 23_445 205 19_445 83 20_445 74 0.9966 0.9156 0.867 
25 8_other 7339 20_443 31 17_443 30 16_443 29 19_443 28 0.9996 0.9934 0.9871 
26 19_80 9940 19_8014 34 19_443 23 18_80 20 0_80 8 0.9995 0.9347 0.976 
27 7_other 6403 6_other 28 20_443 28 19_443 25 21_443 25 0.9996 0.9826 0.9998 
28 0_443 7910 23_443 276 1_443 76 0_53 52 10_other 43 0.9958 0.9314 0.9514 
29 14_53 2407 8_53 2372 9_53 2362 6_53 2356 5_53 2299 0.9937 0.8798 0.8896 
30 21_other 2202 22_other 129 20_other 67 19_other 30 23_other 25 0.9976 0.8368 0.9134 
31 17_443 9118 17_53 121 10_other 70 11_other 70 14_other 61 0.9921 0.9221 0.9451 
32 13_445 3368 9_445 3268 10_445 3074 14_445 3005 12_445 2913 0.9898 0.8844 0.9083 
33 22_443 7782 21_443 138 22_53 64 10_other 62 11_other 61 0.9944 0.9278 0.9478 
34 0_445 4787 23_445 2402 1_445 614 22_445 240 21_445 162 0.9946 0.8597 0.8961 
35 7_7680 3714 6_7680 3651 3_7680 3608 5_7680 3462 4_7680 3205 0.9935 0.8577 0.8854 
36 14_443 6746 14_80 554 15_443 32 13_443 19 11_other 11 0.9981 0.9162 0.9321 
37 9_other 6733 20_443 29 17_443 28 16_443 27 19_443 26 0.9996 0.9931 0.9866 
38 5_other 7046 6_other 34 20_443 33 17_443 31 19_443 30 0.9995 0.9856 0.9856 
39 20_80 6152 21_80 3208 20_8530 48 19_80 16 21_8014 15 0.999 0.9631 0.9417 
40 20_other 2067 19_other 71 9_8530 26 10_7680 25 21_other 20 0.9975 0.8841 0.9074 
41 3_445 1884 2_445 1822 6_445 1790 5_445 1541 7_445 1393 0.9952 0.857 0.8668 
42 12_80 470 10_80 442 0_8530 401 1_8530 398 5_80 383 0.9386 0.6307 0.5864 
43 19_443 7368 19_53 104 20_443 89 10_other 56 11_other 55 0.9916 0.9147 0.8981 
44 21_445 5402 20_445 192 22_445 191 23_445 50 19_445 46 0.9976 0.9128 0.8976 
45 16_80 10327 16_8530 28 16_443 27 10_other 7 15_80 7 0.999 0.9568 0.9323 
46 11_80 13501 10_7680 675 9_7680 526 8_7680 525 11_7680 269 0.9978 0.9378 0.9488 
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47 16_443 3338 17_443 1395 18_443 183 19_443 77 16_53 64 0.9891 0.8586 0.8771 
48 8_443 4670 4_443 1388 12_443 1249 0_443 83 9_443 28 0.998 0.9403 0.9461 
49 17_445 6760 18_445 126 16_445 104 19_445 76 20_445 39 0.9978 0.921 0.9052 
50 6_9997 8338 5_9997 8100 9_9997 8065 7_9997 8013 3_9997 8003 0.9996 0.9687 0.9838 
51 20_445 4910 19_445 3075 21_445 480 18_445 283 22_445 238 0.9952 0.898 0.913 
52 2_8530 22418 7_7680 60 3_7680 54 20_8530 39 5_7680 38 0.9996 0.925 0.9998 
53 20_443 1837 21_443 1713 22_443 537 19_443 284 18_443 193 0.9889 0.8627 0.8727 
54 22_80 8163 23_80 79 21_80 50 22_443 14 11_other 5 0.9993 0.9046 0.9471 
55 12_445 1126 11_445 1005 12_137 949 13_137 947 14_137 942 0.9887 0.8944 0.8765 
56 23_443 7682 0_443 123 23_53 86 23_80 53 11_other 45 0.9957 0.944 0.9491 
57 14_137 1263 9_137 1252 13_137 1228 12_137 1227 10_137 1206 0.9972 0.9195 0.8486 
58 18_443 7467 18_80 125 18_53 103 10_other 49 11_other 49 0.9922 0.9113 0.8901 
59 1_443 8907 0_443 184 2_443 109 9_443 85 5_443 79 0.9968 0.9445 0.9329 
60 9_7680 3067 8_7680 2894 10_7680 2857 11_7680 2851 12_7680 2735 0.9963 0.8719 0.8658 
61 8_389 1030 14_389 1029 7_389 997 12_389 940 10_389 938 0.996 0.8692 0.8381 
62 23_other 460 19_other 430 17_other 414 0_other 381 16_other 366 0.9788 0.7695 0.7601 
63 15_80 11092 14_80 23 15_443 22 15_8530 17 20_443 6 0.9999 0.9844 0.9999 
64 13_443 4906 9_443 23 12_443 16 13_80 15 11_443 14 0.9984 0.9301 0.8971 
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Accuracy Precision Recall 
0 (2.02e-05 - 
2.24e-05]_443 
1607 (2.48e-05 - 
2.75e-05]_443 
1517 (2.24e-05 - 
2.48e-05]_443 
1373 (1.82e-05 - 
2.02e-05]_443 
1248 (2.75e-05 - 
3.05e-05]_443 
1142 0.9922 0.9131 0.9192 
1 (0.000219 - 
0.000243]_other 
14748 (0.000197 - 
0.000219]_other 
8828 (0.00141 - 
0.00157]_other 
4597 (0.00127 - 
0.00141]_other 
4390 (0.00157 - 
0.00174]_other 
3740 0.9962 0.9837 0.9868 
2 (5.69e-05 - 
6.31e-05]_445 
3390 (8.61e-05 - 
9.55e-05]_445 
1923 (9.55e-05 - 
0.000106]_445 
1922 (0.000117 - 
0.00013]_445 
1174 (0.000106 - 
0.000117]_445 
1031 0.9941 0.8763 0.8394 
3 (5.616 - 
6.229]_other 
23517 (1.82e-05 - 
2.02e-05]_other 
3684 (1.64e-05 - 
1.82e-05]_other 
2680 (2.02e-05 - 
2.24e-05]_other 
2212 (0.000501 - 
0.000556]_other 
1320 0.9994 0.9972 0.9959 
4 (1.46 - 
1.62]_137 
10285 (0.000178 - 
0.000197]_137 
5393 (0.00016 - 
0.000178]_137 
2563 (0.00016 - 
0.000178]_445 
2100 (0.000178 - 
0.000197]_445 
1353 0.9853 0.9494 0.9359 
5 (0.0 - 1.11e-
06]_80 
10672 (1.86e-06 - 
2.07e-06]_80 
4043 (1.11e-06 - 
1.23e-06]_80 
2567 (2.07e-06 - 
2.29e-06]_80 
2528 (2.82e-06 - 
3.13e-06]_80 
1740 0.9908 0.9252 0.9298 
6 (0.000117 - 
0.00013]_443 
1004 (0.000243 - 
0.000269]_443 
924 (0.00013 - 
0.000144]_443 
830 (0.000219 - 
0.000243]_443 
818 (0.000144 - 
0.00016]_443 
648 0.9794 0.8014 0.8144 
7 (0.0389 - 
0.0431]_22 
24417 (1.64e-05 - 
1.82e-05]_22 
12846 (1.82e-05 - 
2.02e-05]_22 
12676 (0.000501 - 
0.000556]_22 
11964 (2.02e-05 - 
2.24e-05]_22 
8198 0.9996 0.9913 0.9998 
8 (5.69e-05 - 
6.31e-05]_other 
6492 (5.13e-05 - 
5.69e-05]_other 
4635 (6.31e-05 - 7e-
05]_other 
3671 (4.62e-05 - 
5.13e-05]_other 
3207 (7e-05 - 7.76e-
05]_other 
1744 0.9859 0.9214 0.9214 
9 (0.000407 - 
0.000452]_53 
3389 (4.565 - 
5.063]_53 
2703 (0.000452 - 
0.000501]_53 
2581 (287.928 - 
319.36]_53 
1594 (0.00237 - 
0.00263]_53 
1435 0.9969 0.9597 0.9538 
10 (0.0 - 1.11e-
06]_443 
10045 (1.11e-06 - 
1.23e-06]_443 
2420 (1.86e-06 - 
2.07e-06]_443 
1789 (2.07e-06 - 
2.29e-06]_443 
1113 (2.82e-06 - 
3.13e-06]_443 
482 0.9854 0.9632 0.9657 
11 (0.0209 - 
0.0232]_443 
1275 (0.035 - 
0.0389]_443 
1199 (0.0232 - 
0.0257]_443 
1178 (0.0653 - 
0.0724]_443 
1170 (0.0389 - 
0.0431]_443 
1100 0.946 0.8272 0.8268 
12 (1.993 - 
2.21]_other 
2455 (26.569 - 
29.469]_other 
1382 (8.5 - 
9.428]_other 
1145 (2.21 - 
2.452]_other 
1137 (67.505 - 
74.874]_other 
1134 0.9845 0.8481 0.8646 
13 (659.559 - 
731.56]_other 
1322 (92.114 - 
102.17]_other 
795 (0.0 - 1.11e-
06]_443 
560 (287.928 - 
319.36]_137 
513 (1.82e-05 - 
2.02e-05]_9997 
415 0.9036 0.641 0.5898 
14 (0.0 - 1.11e-
06]_7680 
9029 (1.86e-06 - 
2.07e-06]_7680 
8175 (4.62e-05 - 
5.13e-05]_7680 
6912 (4.17e-05 - 
4.62e-05]_7680 
5888 (5.13e-05 - 
5.69e-05]_7680 
5542 0.9937 0.945 0.95 
15 (1.64e-05 - 
1.82e-05]_other 
2965 (1.82e-05 - 
2.02e-05]_other 
2828 (0.0 - 1.11e-
06]_other 
2297 (2.02e-05 - 
2.24e-05]_other 
2223 (1.48e-05 - 
1.64e-05]_other 
1945 0.9814 0.8954 0.8756 
16 (54.871 - 
60.861]_other 
19942 (113.323 - 
125.694]_other 
271 (0.0 - 1.11e-
06]_443 
45 (171.516 - 
190.239]_other 
31 (1.86e-06 - 
2.07e-06]_443 






















Accuracy Precision Recall 
17 (0.000452 - 
0.000501]_other 
8159 (0.000407 - 
0.000452]_other 
2183 (60.861 - 
67.505]_other 
1277 (0.000501 - 
0.000556]_other 
236 (125.694 - 
139.415]_other 
192 0.9987 0.9865 0.9665 
18 (0.0 - 1.11e-
06]_445 
13735 (1.86e-06 - 
2.07e-06]_445 
4276 (1.11e-06 - 
1.23e-06]_445 
3316 (2.07e-06 - 
2.29e-06]_445 
2670 (2.82e-06 - 
3.13e-06]_445 
1308 0.9946 0.9613 0.9531 
19 (0.965 - 
1.07]_other 
10690 (1.993 - 
2.21]_other 
122 (0.0 - 1.11e-
06]_443 
55 (1.86e-06 - 
2.07e-06]_443 
32 (1.46 - 
1.62]_137 
21 0.9992 0.9795 0.9732 
20 (0.000684 - 
0.000758]_other 
7980 (0.000616 - 
0.000684]_other 
28 (0.0 - 1.11e-
06]_443 
22 (1.86e-06 - 
2.07e-06]_443 
13 (1.46 - 
1.62]_137 
9 1 1 1 
21 (19.471 - 
21.596]_other 
9165 (0.000616 - 
0.000684]_other 
816 (0.000556 - 
0.000616]_other 
29 (40.212 - 
44.602]_other 
27 (0.0 - 1.11e-
06]_443 
20 0.9996 0.9599 0.979 
22 (1.82e-05 - 
2.02e-05]_445 
4642 (2.02e-05 - 
2.24e-05]_445 
3884 (1.64e-05 - 
1.82e-05]_445 
3711 (2.24e-05 - 
2.48e-05]_445 
2262 (0.000841 - 
0.000933]_445 
2236 0.9713 0.8636 0.8636 
23 (1.86e-06 - 
2.07e-06]_443 
2940 (2.82e-06 - 
3.13e-06]_443 
2173 (2.07e-06 - 
2.29e-06]_443 
1827 (3.76e-05 - 
4.17e-05]_443 
960 (0.0 - 1.11e-
06]_443 
932 0.9675 0.9107 0.9111 
24 (0.0 - 1.11e-
06]_8530 
17136 (1.11e-06 - 
1.23e-06]_8530 
4138 (1.86e-06 - 
2.07e-06]_8530 
3869 (2.07e-06 - 
2.29e-06]_8530 
2410 (2.82e-06 - 
3.13e-06]_8530 
1115 0.9972 0.9387 0.9432 
25 (49.471 - 
54.871]_other 
11079 (2.719 - 
3.016]_other 
4393 (5.616 - 
6.229]_other 
1285 (3.016 - 
3.345]_other 
290 (54.871 - 
60.861]_137 
105 0.9995 0.9876 0.9651 
26 (0.000616 - 
0.000684]_other 
15268 (0.0 - 1.11e-
06]_443 
69 (1.86e-06 - 
2.07e-06]_443 
43 (1.46 - 
1.62]_137 
31 (2.07e-06 - 
2.29e-06]_443 
27 0.9995 0.985 0.985 
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76 Netherlands_bytes 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 





2613 Ukraine_bytes 91 Ukraine_pkts 80 United 
States_bytes 
16 0.9999 0.9884 0.9999 
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